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FURTHER AND FURTHER, AMEN: EXPANDED 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 
JURISDICTION OVER RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 
Abstract: The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) is charged with pro-
tecting workers’ rights through providing access to collective bargaining and en-
forcing unfair labor complaints. This charge meets an oft-competing mission, 
however, when applied to religiously affiliated educational institutions, which 
are guaranteed the protections of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
For many years, parochial schools have been beyond the reach of the NLRB. 
But with the Board’s 2014 decision in Pacific Lutheran University, that 
longstanding de facto moratorium has been called into question. This Note ar-
gues that the NLRB’s recently expanded jurisdiction is both inappropriate and 
likely unconstitutional. Ultimately, this Note recommends voluntary bargaining 
outside the NLRB framework as a way for the NLRB to avoid unconstitutional 
entanglement with religious schools and for religious educators to practice what 
they preach. 
INTRODUCTION 
Across the United States, thousands of elementary and high schools af-
filiated with the Catholic Church educate approximately two million stu-
dents each year.1 It is a fundamental aspect of these schools’ educational 
and spiritual mission to incorporate religion into their operation.2 Despite 
the schools’ religious leadership and identity, their teachers and professional 
staff are overwhelmingly laypersons.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Frequently Requested Church Statistics, CTR. FOR APPLIED RES. IN THE APOSTOLATE, 
http://cara.georgetown.edu/caraservices/requestedchurchstats.html [http://perma.cc/XWH9-J8LD]; 
The Condition of Education, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/
indicator_cgc.asp [http://perma.cc/L7V7-AF7N] (listing enrollment statistics for Catholic pre-
kindergarten, elementary, and high schools); United States Catholic Elementary and Secondary 
Schools 2014–2015: The Annual Statistical Report on Schools, Enrollment, and Staffing, NAT’L 
CATH. EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.ncea.org/data-information/catholic-school-data [http://perma.cc/
WVF9-833H] [hereinafter United States Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools] (reporting 
enrollment statistics for Catholic elementary and secondary schools). 
 2 See Private Schools in the United States: A Statistical Profile, 1993–94, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STAT., http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/ps/97459ch2.asp [http://perma.cc/2N9G-3H8S] (“The most 
important goal of [Catholic parochial] schools, as rated by their principals, was religious devel-
opment.”). 
 3 See United States Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 1 (estimating 
that 97.2% of employees of U.S. Catholic elementary and secondary schools are laypersons); see 
also Catholic School Leaders Chart the Future of Catholic Education at GSE Symposium, FORD-
HAM UNIV. (May 2008), http://legacy.fordham.edu/campus_resources/enewsroom/archives/archive_
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One such school is Nativity Preparatory School (“Nativity Prep”), a 
private, Catholic middle school in Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts affiliated 
with and sponsored by the Society of Jesus (“Jesuits”), led by a Jesuit presi-
dent, and indirectly controlled by the regional Jesuit Provincial, who must 
approve appointments to the Board of Trustees.4 Recently, the National La-
bor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) opened an unfair labor prac-
tice charge against Nativity Prep.5 The case stemmed from Nativity Prep’s 
termination of a social worker who allegedly spoke out, during staff orienta-
tion, about the school’s “increased emphasis on God.”6 The social worker 
allegedly said numerous times, during the orientation and afterwards, that 
she “rejected” Nativity Prep’s Jesuit mission and felt oppressed by the 
school’s emphasis on God.7 
One might expect the clergy administrators of a religious school, when 
faced with a staff member actively and openly undermining the school’s reli-
gious mission, to determine that the employment relationship is no longer 
viable.8 That it what occurred in the case of Nativity Prep—a religious school 
wanted its faculty and staff to support its religious message, and therefore 
terminated an employee not aligned with those goals.9 Now, however, Nativi-
ty Prep could face an investigation into the circumstances of the termination 
to determine whether the school’s action constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice—whether the clergy administrators of the school acted in good faith in 
reaching the conclusion that the social worker was undermining the school’s 
religious mission.10 
                                                                                                                           
1273.asp [http://perma.cc/Z2K3-3BJZ] (estimating, in 2008, that laypeople made up 96% of Cath-
olic school teachers). 
 4 See Our Mission, NATIVITY PREPARATORY SCH., http://www.nativityboston.org/our_school.
html [http://perma.cc/LXF9-58MQ] (describing school’s Jesuit affiliation and tradition); Letter 
from John F. Welsh, Esq., Att’y for Nativity Preparatory Sch., to Emily Goldman, Reg’l Office, 
NLRB at 1–2 (Jan. 29, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Welsh] (describing 
characteristics, Jesuit affiliation, and extensive Jesuit ties of Nativity Preparatory School). 
 5 See Nativity Preporatory Sch., Case No. 01-CA-144463, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://
www.nlrb.gov/case/01-CA-144463 [http://perma.cc/9UD4-9NPY] (listing case against Nativity 
Preparatory School for unfair labor practice allegation). 
 6 See Letter from Welsh, supra note 4, at 5. 
 7 See id. The employer contends that the social worker in fact “repeatedly stated during the 
orientation, and thereafter, that she rejected the Jesuit mission of the school and that she found the 
school’s focus on God to be oppressive.” Id. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi. (Catholic Bishop III), 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (stating 
that the resolution of unfair labor practice complaints at parochial schools by the NLRB “in many 
instances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the cler-
gy-administrators and its relationship to the school’s religious mission”); see also 29 U.S.C. § 160 
(2012) (“The Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor 
practice . . . affecting commerce.”). 
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Such a scenario would previously have been unthinkable, for the U.S. 
Supreme Court nearly half a century ago firmly concluded that parochial 
schools were outside NLRB jurisdiction.11 But in 2014, in Pacific Lutheran 
University, the Board introduced a new standard for determining its juris-
diction.12 By focusing on the role of the specific employees of religiously 
affiliated colleges and universities, rather than the institutions as a whole, 
the Board made jurisdictional claims over schools like Nativity Prep a far 
more likely possibility.13 
With Pacific Lutheran, the Board expanded its reach dramatically in 
announcing a new two-part test that would evaluate not only how a college 
or university held itself out as an institution, but how it held out the roles of 
its faculty.14 If the university did not hold out specific faculty as performing 
a specific function in providing the school’s religious educational environ-
ment, those employees would be eligible for unionization through NLRB-
certified elections.15 The NLRB would also have the power to resolve unfair 
labor practice claims made by those employees.16 Since Pacific Lutheran, 
an NLRB Regional Director has already approved jurisdiction over a num-
ber of Catholic colleges and universities, and the Board has signaled plans 
to further expand jurisdiction over religious schools.17 
Although the holding of Pacific Lutheran applied, on its face, only to 
colleges and universities, its principles and its test mark a worrisome turn 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 506 (concluding that Congress did not intend for 
church-operated elementary and secondary schools to be under NLRB jurisdiction); Susan J. Sta-
bile, Blame It on Catholic Bishop: The Question of NLRB Jurisdiction over Religious Colleges 
and Universities, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1317, 1324 (2013) (characterizing Catholic Bishop’s holding 
as excluding teachers in church-operated high schools from NLRB jurisdiction). 
 12 See Pac. Lutheran Univ., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 1, 5 (2014) (articulating new test focused 
on holding out of both institution as a whole and specific faculty); Mary Kay Klimesh et al., NLRB 
Continues Its Involvement in Cases Affecting the Academic Employer, SEYFARTH SHAW (Jan. 14, 
2014), http://www.seyfarth.com/uploads/siteFiles/publications/NLRBContinuesitsInvolvementinCases
AffectingtheAcademicEmployer.pdf [http://perma.cc/9XMD-AWSM] (noting that the principles 
of Pacific Lutheran and associated cases “have the potential for impacting primary and secondary 
schools”). 
13 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 5 (articulating new test focused on holding out 
of both institution as a whole and specific faculty). 
 14 See id. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (“The Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in 
any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”). 
 17  See Seattle Univ., No. 19-RC-122863, 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 39, at *1 
(N.L.R.B. Mar. 3, 2015) (“[T]he Employer has not met its burden of establishing that its faculty 
serve a specific role in creating or maintaining the university’s religious educational environ-
ment.”); Saint Xavier Univ., No. 13-RC-092296, 2015 WL 628582, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 12, 
2015) (remanding to Regional Director “for further appropriate action consistent with Pacific 
Lutheran University”); Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Spirit, No. 06-RC-080933, 2015 WL 628580, 
at *1 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 12, 2015) (same); Manhattan Coll., No. 02-RC-23543, 2015 WL 456602, at 
*1 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 3, 2015) (same). 
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for religious elementary and secondary schools.18 If it is no longer the insti-
tution, but the specific employee, that must be performing a religious func-
tion, then the de facto moratorium on parochial school jurisdiction that has 
continued since Catholic Bishop may be in jeopardy.19 
This Note argues that the NLRB’s expanding jurisdiction over reli-
gious schools is inappropriate, and probably unconstitutional—particularly 
in the case of parochial schools.20 Part I explains the establishment and mis-
sion of the NLRB and the major developments in Board jurisdiction over 
religious schools since 1970.21 Part I also details the complicated relation-
ship between religious organizations’ support for workers’ rights and their 
current resistance to NLRB jurisdiction and unionization for their own em-
ployees.22 Part II describes the Pacific Lutheran decision, its fallout, and the 
lingering uncertainty it has produced.23 Part III argues that the NLRB’s Pa-
cific Lutheran test, and the resulting expanded Board jurisdiction, is inap-
propriate when applied to religious schools and likely unconstitutional.24 
Part III then proposes voluntary bargaining outside the NLRB framework as 
an alternative that could benefit both employees and religious employers.25 
I. A SHORT, BUT FRAUGHT, HISTORY: NLRB JURISDICTION OVER 
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) endows the 
NLRB with broad powers, yet those powers brush up against a formidable 
limit in the religion clauses of the First Amendment.26 This Part describes 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Klimesh et al., supra note 12 (noting that “the principles presented in” Pacific Lutheran 
could be extended to elementary and secondary schools). 
 19 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 7 (“We find that the focus of our inquiry into 
whether there is a ‘significant risk’ of infringement under Catholic Bishop must be on the faculty 
members themselves, rather than on the nature of the university as a whole.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 502)); Jeffrey A. Berman, NLRB Receives an “Incom-
plete” in School Case, SEYFARTH SHAW (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/
MA122214-LE [http://perma.cc/7SP3-FTUU] (noting that the Board jurisdiction could be expand-
ed beyond colleges and universities in the wake of Pacific Lutheran); Klimesh et al., supra note 
12 (describing how Pacific Lutheran’s holding could be applied to elementary and secondary 
schools). 
 20 See infra notes 109–212 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 26–93 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 94–107 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 108–154 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 155–191 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 192–212 and accompanying text. 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. I (forbidding Congress from enacting legislation “respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”); see Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 
499 (stating that, despite the “broad scope” of the NLRA, the Constitution generally, and First 
Amendment specifically, are limits on the Board’s power); Stabile, supra note 11, at 1321 (argu-
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the tension and history of Board jurisdiction over religious schools.27 Sec-
tion A gives an overview of the NLRB—its establishment, purpose, and 
procedures, as well as how it typically interacts with educational institu-
tions.28 Section B gives an overview of First Amendment freedom of reli-
gion principles.29 Section C details the history of NLRB jurisdiction over 
religious schools up to its Pacific Lutheran decision.30 Section D discusses 
the contradiction between religious organizations’ rhetorical support for 
workers’ rights and their resistance to Board jurisdiction.31 
A. The National Labor Relations Board: Establishment,  
Purpose, and Procedures 
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA, which sought to protect workers’ 
rights and facilitate union representation and collective bargaining throughout 
the United States.32 The Act also contained a list of prohibited unfair labor 
practices by employers.33 It created the NLRB to effectuate its provisions, in-
cluding procedures for unfair labor practice complaints, reviews, Board deci-
sions, and appeals.34 Following a negative response from both employers and 
                                                                                                                           
ing that NLRB’s ability to facilitate collective bargaining should only be curtailed when a consti-
tutional violation is likely to result). 
 27 See infra notes 32–107 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 30–46 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 47–70 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 70–93 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 94–112 and accompanying text. 
 32 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012). In 1934, Congress had author-
ized the President to establish a three-member board to implement and enforce the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act (“NIRA”), ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (previously codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 701–03 
(Supp., 1934)), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935)). Pursuant to this authorization, President Franklin Roosevelt created the three-member 
board, the so-called “Old NLRB,” by executive order in 1934, but the NIRA was found unconsti-
tutional the following year. A.L.A. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 550; Exec. Order No. 6763, (June 29, 
1934), reprinted in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 322, 
322 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1938). The Act reads, in part: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of 
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and 
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of 
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of 
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their 
employment or other mutual aid or protection. 
29 U.S.C. § 151. 
 33 29 U.S.C. § 158. 
 34 Id. §§ 153, 158, 160. An employee or employee’s representative may file a complaint alleg-
ing unfair labor practices with the Board, on which the Board will hold a hearing(s) and investi-
gates before issuing a decision. Id. § 160(b)–(c). The Board can petition federal district or appel-
late courts for enforcement of its order. Id. § 160(e). Anyone aggrieved by an order of the Board 
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labor, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”) (popularly 
known as the “Taft-Hartley Act”) substantially amended the NLRA.35 In addi-
tion to expanding the scope of unfair labor practices, with a focus on the prac-
tices of unions themselves, the LMRA expanded the NLRB to five members 
from three.36 
The NLRB has twenty-six regional offices across the United States, each 
of which is headed by a Regional Director.37 Employees, employees’ repre-
sentatives, or employers can file unfair labor practice charges, which are then 
investigated and reviewed.38 The Board receives between 20,000 and 30,000 
such complaints annually.39 If the relevant Regional Director determines that 
the claim has sufficient merit, and a settlement cannot be reached, the Board 
will issue a complaint.40 After an unfair labor practice complaint is filed, and 
again if settlement fails, the case is heard before an Administrative Law 
Judge, whose decision can be appealed to the Board.41 The five Board mem-
bers are appointed by the President to five-year terms.42 
NLRB jurisdiction over educational institutions plays out in two 
ways.43 First, when employees petition for union representation, the Board 
oversees a representation election and then certifies the results of that elec-
tion.44 Second, the Board fields, investigates, and resolves unfair labor prac-
                                                                                                                           
can seek review by the U.S. court of appeals in the district in which the unfair labor practice was 
alleged, or in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Id. 
 35  Id. §§ 141–197; 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1947-taft-hartley-substantive-provisions [http://perma.
cc/K82W-ZUNG]; Enforcement of the Wagner Act, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.
gov/who-we-are/our-history/enforcement-wagner-act [http://perma.cc/Z29E-UTEB] (“The budding 
[NLRB] was besieged not only by employers, but by labor unions as well.”). 
 36 29 U.S.C. §§ 151(a), 158. 
 37 NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.5 (2014) (defining Regional Director); Who 
We Are, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are [http://perma.cc/XJP6-4773]. 
 38 Stabile, supra note 11, at 1322 (describing who can file unfair labor practice complaints and 
thereby trigger NLRB investigations); Investigative Charges, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://
www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges [http://perma.cc/XJP6-4773]. 
 39 Investigative Charges, supra note 38. 
 40 Stabile, supra note 11, at 1322 (explaining that the NLRB will issue formal complaints 
against employers after a finding of merit in the charge and after arbitration fails); Investigative 
Charges, supra note 38. 
 41 Stabile, supra note 11, at 1322 (explaining that, if a case is not settled following a formal 
complaint, it will be heard by an Administrative Law Judge, with an opportunity for appeal); Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Decisions, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/cases-dec
isions/administrative-law-judge-decisions [http://perma.cc/9PFB-4Q5G] (describing the role of 
Administrative Law Judge hearings in the complaint process); Investigative Charges, supra note 
38 (describing the complaint, investigation, and appeals process). 
 42 Who We Are, supra note 37. 
 43 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 159–62; Stabile, supra note 11, at 1321–22; What We Do, NAT’L LAB. 
REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do [http://perma.cc/D6XR-AJ6B] (listing conducting 
elections and investigating charges as two functions of the NLRB). 
 44 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
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tice complaints.45 Once a union is certified, the employer must bargain in 
good faith with the union regarding “wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment” or face an unfair labor practice complaint.46 In-
vestigations of unfair labor practice charges typically consist of Board em-
ployees gathering evidence and sometimes taking affidavits.47 
B. First Amendment Freedom of Religion Principles 
The “religion clauses” of the First Amendment provide that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . . .” 48  These clauses generally serve distinct, but 
complementary, purposes.49 The purpose of the free exercise clause is to 
guarantee the religious liberty of the individual, free from compulsion from 
the state.50 The interpretation of the scope of the establishment clause has 
been somewhat more varied and complex.51  
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that the establishment clause does more than what a literal reading of it 
would suggest—that it erects a dividing wall between the affairs of gov-
                                                                                                                           
 45 Id. §§ 160–162. 
 46 Id. § 158; see Stabile, supra note 11, at 1322. 
 47 Investigative Charges, supra note 38. 
 48 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (describing the 
content and history of the religion clauses). 
 49 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (stating that although the establishment and 
free exercise clauses may sometimes “overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of govern-
mental encroachment upon religious freedom”); Universidad Cent. de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 
F.2d 383, 394 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc) (stating that although the clauses address different forms 
of encroachment, they are nevertheless “compatible and mutually supportive”). There is, however, 
also an inherent potential tension in the clauses’ separate goals; government’s inability to promote 
a given religion can hinder the practice of that religion. See Comm. for Pub. Ed. & Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) (discussing the “tension” between the clauses and the 
difficulty of promoting free exercise without violating the establishment clause); Walz, 397 U.S. at 
668–69. 
 50 See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating purpose of 
free exercise clause); Zachary J. Phillipps, Non-Prophets: Why For-Profit, Secular Corporations 
Cannot Exercise Religion Within the Meaning of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 
39, 46 (2014), http://connecticutlawreview.org/files/2014/04/PhillippsNote.Non-Prophets.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2JT2-9F5H] (describing the design of the free exercise clause as protecting individuals 
against government interference in their religious beliefs). 
 51See Eric Rassbach, Lemon, Marsh, and Refounding Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 15 
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 490, 492 (2014) (discussing the lack of clarity in current establishment 
clause jurisprudence). See generally Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Estab-
lishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 728 (2006) (chronicling Supreme Court justices’ 
varying approaches to the establishment clause and describing the current state of Supreme Court 
establishment clause jurisprudence as a “hopeless muddle” lacking clarity); Lisa Shaw Roy, His-
tory, Transparency, and the Establishment Clause: A Proposal for Reform, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 
683 (2008) (detailing different Supreme Court justices’ historical interpretations of the establish-
ment clause’s scope and motivation). 
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ernment and those of religious groups and organizations.52 In 1947, in Ever-
son v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment applied the establishment clause to the states.53 
In Everson, the Court reviewed a New Jersey program reimbursing the par-
ents of children using public transportation but attending parochial 
schools.54 Although the Court held that the reimbursement program was 
constitutional, it set a high bar, at least rhetorically, for judicial interpreta-
tion of the establishment clause.55 The Court heard a number of education-
related establishment clause challenges in the years following Everson, with 
varied holdings.56 
In the 1970s, the Court took a significant step forward in the develop-
ment of its establishment clause doctrine.57 In 1970, in Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion, the Court held that regardless of the intent underlying a statute, it cannot 
produce “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”58 The fol-
lowing year, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court expanded on the holding in 
Walz and set forth three requirements for a statute to pass muster under the 
establishment clause.59 First, the legislation must have a secular purpose.60 
Second, its primary result cannot be the advancement or hindrance of reli-
                                                                                                                           
 52 See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (stating that the religion clauses “will not tolerate . . . gov-
ernmental interference with religion”); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 217 (referring to wall of separation); 
Engel, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (same); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 
(1948) (same); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947) (stating that the establishment 
clause “erected a wall between church and state” and prohibits the entanglement of government in 
religious affairs, and vice-versa). 
 53 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 702 (noting that Everson first applied the establishment clause to 
state action); Everson, 330 U.S. at 14–15 (reasoning that the establishment clause, like the free 
exercise clause, should be extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 54 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. 
 55 See id. at 18 (stating that, although the New Jersey program is constitutional, the Court 
must keep the wall dividing church and state “high and impregnable” and cannot allow “the 
slightest breach”). 
 56 See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205 (holding reading biblical passages in public school 
unconstitutional); Engel, 370 U.S. at 422–24 (holding unconstitutional prayer in public school); 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308, 312 (1952) (holding constitutional program in which stu-
dents were released from public school mid-day to attend off-site religious classes); McCollum, 
333 U.S. at 212 (holding unconstitutional joint public school-religious group education program). 
 57 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (introducing new test for evaluating legislation under the estab-
lishment clause); James A. Serritella, Tangling with Entanglement: Toward a Constitutional Eval-
uation of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 144–45 (1981) (describing 
the Walz test and characterizing it as the first appearance of an entanglement test). 
 58 Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. Identifying the government actions against which the establishment 
clause is meant to protect as state sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement in reli-
gion, the Court then stated, in summary, that the religion clauses “will not tolerate either govern-
mentally established religion or governmental interference with religion.” Id. at 668–69. 
 59 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (describing new test drawing in part 
from Walz). 
60 Id. 
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gion.61 Finally, drawing from Walz, the Court held the legislation cannot “fos-
ter ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”62 The Court, in 
the context of government aid, pointed to three factors in judging whether the 
entanglement is indeed excessive: “the character and purposes of the institu-
tions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the 
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.”63  
In the time since Lemon, there has been disagreement and criticism, 
both on the bench and beyond, over its test.64 Yet the Court has repeatedly 
declined to strike it down and has continued to employ it.65  
C. The NLRB’s Expanding Religious Jurisdiction 
The NLRA, on its face, gives the Board broad jurisdiction over em-
ployers, with limited explicit exceptions, which do not include educational 
institutions or religious organizations.66 Nevertheless, in its earliest decades 
of operation, the Board declined to exert jurisdiction over nonprofit educa-
                                                                                                                           
61 Id. 
 62 See id. at 613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). Although Walz had not indicated what 
might constitute “excessive entanglement,” Lemon held that a program through which a state re-
imbursed religious schools for a portion of teacher salaries and supplies was unconstitutional un-
der this prong of the test. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606–07; Walz, 397 U.S. at 670. 
 63 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. In a striking conclusion, the Court stated that, while some 
entanglement is inevitable, in “our [American] system the choice has been made that government 
is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and churches excluded from the 
affairs of government.” Id. at 625. 
 64 See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 14 (2011) (mem.) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting instances in which the Court had ignored 
Lemon); Gey, supra note 51, at 730–36 (inventorying conservative justices’ opposition to the 
Lemon test). 
 65 See Gey, supra note 51, at 731 (describing the Lemon test as “the primary focus of” essen-
tially all the Court’s establishment clause decisions since Lemon); see, e.g., McCreary County v. 
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005) (explicitly declining to abandon Lemon test); Santa Fe Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314 (2000) (examining school policy under Lemon test); Mellen 
v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (describing Lemon test as that most frequently em-
ployed by the Supreme Court in establishment clause analyses). The Court has found many differ-
ent schemes to be unconstitutional entanglements. See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 694 
(1989) (finding non-routine government regulatory interaction entailing questioning of religious 
doctrine violated First Amendment); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) 
(finding unconstitutional an arraignment that forced religious organization to litigate with the 
government over “what does or does not have religious meaning”—even if only once); Presbyteri-
an Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 
(1969) (holding that a civil court’s questioning of church doctrine and evaluating of the doctrine’s 
importance to the faith addressed “matters at the very core of a religion” and was therefore uncon-
stitutional). 
 66 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (exempting from the definition of “employer” “the United States or any 
wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political 
subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act”); Stabile, supra note 11, at 
1322 (noting the NLRA’s lack of express exemption for educational employers and employees). 
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tional institutions.67 In the 1970s, the Board changed course, asserting juris-
diction first over private colleges and universities whose operations signifi-
cantly impacted interstate commerce, then over private, nonprofit secondary 
schools, and finally over all private colleges, universities, or secondary 
schools that met certain revenue requirements.68 
Subsequently, the expansion extended to religiously affiliated educa-
tional institutions.69 In 1975, in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 
the Board clarified that its policy was to decline jurisdiction only over 
“completely religious” educational institutions, not those that were merely 
“associated” with a given faith.70 Religiously affiliated organizations over 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Trs. of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B 424, 427 (1951) (declining to exercise jurisdiction 
over nonprofit university “where the activities involved are noncommercial in nature and intimate-
ly connected with the charitable purposes and educational activities” of the university), overruled 
by Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B 329, 334 (1970); Stabile, supra note 11, at 1323 (noting that until 
1970 the Board declined to exert jurisdiction over nonprofit educational institutions). 
 68 NLRB Other Rules, 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (2014) (specifying Board policy of asserting juris-
diction over “any private nonprofit college or university which has a gross annual revenue . . . of 
not less than $1 million”); Academia San Jorge, 234 N.L.R.B. 1181, 1181 (1978) (stating insuffi-
cient revenue as reason for declining jurisdiction over Catholic elementary and secondary school); 
Judson Sch., 209 N.L.R.B. 677, 677 (1974) (asserting jurisdiction over private elementary and 
high school with annual revenues in excess of $1 million); Windsor Sch., 199 N.L.R.B. 457, 457 
(1972) (stating insufficient revenue as reason for declining jurisdiction over private, for-profit 
secondary school); Shattuck Sch., 189 N.L.R.B. 886, 886 (1971) (asserting jurisdiction over pri-
vate secondary school with annual revenues in excess of $1 million); Cornell, 183 N.L.R.B at 334 
(“[A]ssertion of jurisdiction is required over those private colleges and universities whose opera-
tions have a substantial effect on commerce . . . .”); Stabile, supra note 11, at 1323 n.27 (noting 
that, following its Cornell decision, the Board began to assert jurisdiction over secondary schools 
in addition to institutions of higher education). In its 1970 Cornell decision, the Board justified its 
change in policy by citing, among other factors, the “expanding congressional recognition” that 
employees of nonprofit institutions “are entitled to the same benefits which Federal statutes pro-
vide to employees” of for-profit organizations. Cornell, 183 N.L.R.B at 332–33. The Board specif-
ically stated that it would “no longer decline to assert jurisdiction over [nonprofit educational] 
institutions as a class.” Id. at 331 (emphasis added). 
 69 See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Balt., 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 250 (1975); Henry M. Hald 
High Sch. Ass’n, 213 N.L.R.B. 415, 418 n.7 (1974), enforcement denied by NLRB v. Bishop Ford 
Cent. Catholic High Sch., 623 F.2d 818 (2d. Cir. 1980); see also Ass’n of Hebrew Teachers of 
Metro. Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1058 (1974) (“[T]he fact that an employer’s activity . . . is 
dedicated to a sectarian religious purpose is not a sufficient reason for the Board to refrain from 
asserting jurisdiction.”). In 1974, in Board of Jewish Education of Greater Washington, D.C., the 
NLRB declined to apply its jurisdiction to a nonprofit Jewish educational association because the 
organization’s operations were noncommercial and did not extend beyond religious education and 
training. See 210 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1037 (1974). Yet later that same year, in its Henry M. Hald High 
School Ass’n decision, the Board exerted jurisdiction over an association operating Catholic dioc-
esan high schools that employed lay teachers. See 213 N.L.R.B. at 416. 
 70 Archdiocese of Balt., 216 N.L.R.B. at 250 (“[T]he Board’s policy . . . has been to decline 
jurisdiction over similar institutions only when they are completely religious, not just religiously 
associated . . . .”). The Board pointed to the Catholic schools’ inclusion of academic subjects other 
than religion in their curricula, noting that simply seeking to provide an education based on Chris-
tian principles is not enough to escape jurisdiction, as “[m]ost religiously associated institutions 
seek to operate in conformity with their religious tenets.” See id. 
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which the NLRB exerted jurisdiction commonly responded that the Board’s 
action violated the religion clauses of the First Amendment.71 The Board 
maintained, however, that the NLRA endowed it with broad powers, and 
that carrying out its mission with “minimal intrusion” on the affairs of reli-
gious schools did not violate the First Amendment.72 
It was in this context that, in 1977, in Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. 
NLRB, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the 
NLRB’s exertion of jurisdiction over private Catholic high schools in Illi-
nois and Indiana.73  The court rejected the Board’s Bishop of Baltimore 
“completely religious” standard and concluded that Board jurisdiction over 
parochial schools would violate the First Amendment and undermine clergy 
school administrators’ ability to carry out their religious missions.74 
The NLRB petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari 
to the Seventh Circuit’s decision, which was granted.75 In 1979, in NLRB v. 
                                                                                                                           
 71 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”); see, e.g., Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 
N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218 (1976) (employer raising possibility of excessive entanglement in opposition 
to Board jurisdiction); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi. (Catholic Bishop I), 220 N.L.R.B. 359, 
359 (1975) (employer contending that the schools in question were religious “minor seminary 
schools” and therefore Board jurisdiction would constitute excessive government entanglement), 
enforcement denied by Catholic Bishop of Chi. v. NLRB (Catholic Bishop II), 559 F.2d 1112 (7th 
Cir. 1977), aff’d, Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. 490; Hald, 213 N.L.R.B. at 418 n.7 (employer 
invoking prospect of excessive entanglement through potential Board actions resulting from asser-
tion of jurisdiction). 
 72 See Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. at 1218 (explicitly disagreeing with employer that Board juris-
diction would result in excessive entanglement in violation of the First Amendment); see also 
Hald, 213 N.L.R.B. at 418 n.7 (reasoning that employer “[chose] to entangle itself in secular af-
fairs” in employing lay, rather than solely religious, teachers). 
 73 Catholic Bishop II, 559 F.2d at 1113–14. The Board had concluded that the Illinois schools 
were sufficiently similar to other nonreligious high schools to fail the Archdiocese of Baltimore 
“completely religious” standard despite their religious association. See Catholic Bishop I, 220 
N.L.R.B. at 359; Archdiocese of Balt., 216 N.L.R.B. at 250. The primary support for the Board’s 
finding was the schools’ own descriptions of their character and mission in public literature, the 
percentage of graduating students matriculating at the diocesan seminary college, and the schools’ 
curricular and extracurricular offerings. Catholic Bishop I, 220 N.L.R.B. at 359. The court treated 
the Indiana schools as similarly situated despite their apparently lesser religious saturation. See 
Catholic Bishop II, 559 F.2d at 1118 n.5. 
 74 Catholic Bishop II, 559 F.2d at 1118, 1123. The court first found that the Board’s Archdio-
cese of Baltimore “completely religious” standard was essentially unworkable, as it contained no 
meaningful guide for the exercise of discretion in distinguishing between “completely religious” 
or “merely religiously associated” institutions. Catholic Bishop II, 559 F.2d at 1118; Archdiocese 
of Balt., 216 N.L.R.B. at 250. The court then turned to the broader constitutional question, con-
cluding that NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools generally would unavoidably “alter[] and 
impinge[] upon [their] religious character” in violation of the First Amendment. See Catholic 
Bishop II, 559 F.2d at 1123. The court also observed that the NLRB’s ability to order collective 
bargaining would infringe upon Catholic bishops’ authority to operate parochial schools in ac-
cordance with their religious beliefs. See id. 
 75 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 434 U.S. 1061, 1061 (1978) (granting writ of certiorari). 
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Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress did 
not intend for NLRB jurisdiction to include teachers at church-operated 
schools.76 The Court found that NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools 
posed a “significant risk” of infringing upon the First Amendment rights of 
these schools.77 Finding no clear Congressional intent to include jurisdiction 
over religious schools in the NLRA, the Court invoked the doctrine of con-
stitutional avoidance and held that the NLRB did not have jurisdiction.78 
In the years immediately following the Catholic Bishop decision, the 
Board continued to exert jurisdiction over those religious educational insti-
tutions it deemed sufficiently dissimilar to the diocesan schools at issue in 
Catholic Bishop, particularly colleges and universities.79 By 1986, however, 
the Board recognized that colleges and universities could possess similar 
characteristics—and present similar First Amendment concerns—to paro-
                                                                                                                           
 76 Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 507 (declining to uphold NLRB jurisdiction over teachers 
in church-operated schools in the absence of clear congressional intent to do so); see also Stabile, 
supra note 11, at 1324 (describing the Court’s holding in Catholic Bishop III as based upon Con-
gress’s lack of express intent that teachers in church-operated schools should be covered by the 
NLRA). 
 77 See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 502 (framing the question before the Court as the “nar-
row inquiry [of] whether the exercise of the Board’s jurisdiction presents a significant risk that the 
First Amendment will be infringed”); see also Stabile, supra note 11, at 1324 (noting the Court’s 
concern that Board jurisdiction over church-operated high schools would result in excessive gov-
ernment entanglement in violation of the First Amendment). 
 78 See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 507 (concluding that “the record affords abundant 
evidence that the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools would 
implicate the guarantees of the Religion Clauses”); Stabile, supra note 11, at 1324 (observing that 
the Court’s chosen interpretation of the NLRA allowed it to avoid delving into more specific ques-
tions of excessive entanglement). The Court also noted “the critical and unique role” occupied by 
teachers in carrying out the religious mission of parochial schools. See Catholic Bishop III, 440 
U.S. at 501. This special role, the Court reasoned, would transform Board investigations of unfair 
labor practices into “inquir[ies] into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-
administrators and its relationship to the school’s religious mission.” See id. at 502. The Court 
stated that the process of these inquiries alone, not just the conclusions reached, could violate the 
First Amendment. See id. The Court also noted the breadth of subjects routinely included in col-
lective bargaining, stating that this would inevitably touch upon religious issues. See id. at 502–03. 
 79 See, e.g., Bishop Ford, 623 F.2d at 822 (declining to affirm Board jurisdiction over Catho-
lic parochial school deemed sufficiently similar to schools at issue in Catholic Bishop cases); 
Lewis Univ., 265 N.L.R.B. 1239, 1239 (1982) (stating that the Court’s Catholic Bishop holding 
covered only “parochial elementary and secondary schools” and concluding that the university in 
question “is not church-operated as contemplated by Catholic Bishop”); Coll. of Notre Dame, 245 
N.L.R.B. 386, 387 (1979) (distinguishing, for purposes of exercising jurisdiction, between institu-
tions of higher education and elementary and secondary schools); see also Stabile, supra note 11, 
at 1324 (describing the NLRB’s initial view that Catholic Bishop did not prohibit it from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over colleges and universities). In addition to colleges and universities, however, 
the Board also exercised jurisdiction in 1979 over a Catholic secondary school, determining that it 
was not “church-operated” because it was “governed by an independent, lay board of trustees” 
rather than the local diocese. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 243 N.L.R.B. 49, 50–51 
(1979). 
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chial schools.80 The Board therefore adopted a new approach, which came 
to be known as the “substantial religious character” test.81 Under this ap-
proach, the Board holistically evaluated, “on a case-by-case basis, all as-
pects of a religious school’s organization and function that may be relevant 
to ‘the inquiry whether the exercise of the Board’s jurisdiction presents a 
significant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed.’”82 
In 2000, the Board applied the “substantial religious character” test in 
choosing to enforce NLRB certification of a representation election for fac-
ulty members of the University of Great Falls, a private Catholic university 
founded by the Order of the Sisters of Providence.83 The university ap-
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Tr. of St. Joseph’s Coll., 282 N.L.R.B. 65, 68 (1986) (declining to draw a distinction, 
because of First Amendment concerns, between elementary and secondary schools and institutions 
of higher education); see also Livingstone Coll., 286 N.L.R.B. 1308, 1309 (1987) (describing the 
Board’s conclusion, in St. Joseph’s College, that the nature and characteristics of the college 
“raised a significant possibility” of First Amendment infringement from Board jurisdiction); Sta-
bile, supra note 11, at 1324 (describing the Board’s reasoning in applying Catholic Bishop beyond 
elementary and high schools). 
 81 See St. Joseph’s Coll., 282 N.L.R.B. at 68 (“[W]e find that we can more properly accom-
modate first amendment concerns by considering the application of Catholic Bishop to all educa-
tional institutions on a case-by-case basis.”); see also Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 503 
(“[P]arochial schools involve substantial religious activity and purpose.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616)); Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB (Great Falls II), 278 F.3d 1335, 
1339 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Univ. of Great Falls (Great Falls I), 331 N.L.R.B. 1663, 1664 (“Since 
Catholic Bishop, the Board has decided on a case-by-case basis whether a religion-affiliated 
school has a ‘substantial religious character’ and therefore whether the exercise of the Board’s 
jurisdiction would present a significant risk of infringing on that employer’s First Amendment 
rights.” (quoting Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 502)), vacated, Great Falls II, 278 F.3d 1135; 
Stabile, supra note 11, at 1324 (describing the development of the “substantial religious character” 
test). 
 82 See St. Joseph’s Coll., 282 N.L.R.B. at 68 n.10 (quoting Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 
502). In the case of St. Joseph’s College, the Board applied the “substantial religious character” 
test and determined that the school was church-operated because of the high degree of administra-
tive control exerted by the Sisters of Mercy of Maine and the explicit religious requirements im-
posed by it on college faculty members. See id. at 68. By contrast, the Board applied the same test 
to the case of Livingstone College and decided that jurisdiction was appropriate given the “primar-
ily secular” purpose of the college, lax religious requirements for faculty members, and lack of 
day-to-day administrative involvement by the overseeing church. See Livingstone, 286 N.L.R.B. at 
1310. In 1987, in Jewish Day School of Greater Washington, the Board relied on the test and 
chose not to exercise jurisdiction over a Jewish K–12 school in a unionization push by teachers of 
secular subjects, citing the school’s substantial religious purpose as evidenced by a “substantial 
suffusion of religion into the curriculum,” required prayer services, and efforts to conform with 
Jewish doctrine, among other factors. See 283 N.L.R.B. 757, 761–62 (1987). 
 83 Great Falls I, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1663, 1666. In employing the test, the Board looked beyond 
the institution’s religious affiliation, examining factors such as “the purpose of the employer’s 
operations, the role of the unit employees in effectuating that purpose, and the potential effects if 
the Board exercised jurisdiction.” See id. at 1664. In reaching its conclusion that “the University’s 
purpose and function are primarily secular,” the Board cited a number of factors relating to the 
school’s operation, including its governance and lay leadership, lack of Catholic emphasis in the 
curriculum, faculty hiring without religious requirements, absence of Catholic doctrine in univer-
sity policies, and the sizeable non-Catholic proportion of the student body. See id. at 1665–66. 
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pealed, and in 2002, in University of Great Falls v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Board’s deci-
sion.84 The court held that the Board did not have jurisdiction over the uni-
versity, and rejected the “substantial religious character” test in favor of a 
new standard.85  The court’s new test would exempt an institution from 
NLRB jurisdiction if the school met three conditions. 86  First, it must 
“‘hold[] itself out to students, faculty and community’ as providing a reli-
gious educational environment.”87 Second, it must be “organized as a ‘non-
profit.’”88 Third, the institution must be “affiliated with, or owned, operated, 
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a recognized religious organization, 
or with an entity, membership of which is determined, at least in part, with 
reference to religion.”89 
The Board subsequently exercised jurisdiction over Carroll College, a 
private institution affiliated with the Synod of Lakes and Prairies of the 
United Presbyterian Church.90 The college appealed the Board’s decision, 
which, in 2009 in Carroll College, Inc. v. NLRB, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1337. 
 85 Id. at 1347–48; see Nicholas Macri, Note, Missing God in Some Things: The NLRB’s Juris-
dictional Test Fails to Grasp the Religious Nature of Catholic Colleges and Universities, 55 B.C. 
L. REV. 609, 622 (2014) (characterizing the court’s reasoning in rejecting the “substantial reli-
gious character” test); see also Stabile, supra note 11, at 1319 (noting that the probing nature of 
the “substantial religious character” test led the court to adopt a new test in Great Falls). In Great 
Falls II, the court characterized the “substantial religious character” test as precisely the sort of 
probing inquiry rejected in Catholic Bishop. See Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1341. As evidence of 
the “trolling,” invasive nature of the NLRB’s inquiry under the “substantial religious character” 
test, the court offered the Board’s thorough questioning of Great Falls’s president regarding the 
school’s religious mission and how it was implemented and maintained. See id. at 1342–43. 
 86 Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1347; see also Stabile, supra note 11, at 1328 (describing the 
D.C. Circuit’s “bright-line” Great Falls test); Macri, supra note 85, at 623 (describing the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach in Great Falls II). 
 87 Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1343 (quoting Bayamon, 793 F.2d at 403); see also Stabile, 
supra note 11, at 1328 (describing the requirements of the Great Falls test); Macri, supra note 85, 
at 623 (same). 
 88 Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1343; see also Stabile, supra note 11, at 1328 (describing the 
requirements of the Great Falls test); Macri, supra note 85, at 623 (same). 
 89 Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1343; see also Stabile, supra note 11, at 1328 (describing the 
requirements of the Great Falls test); Macri, supra note 85, at 623 (same). The court declined to 
fully adopt the third prong, as the University of Great Falls clearly satisfied it. See id. at 1343–44. 
 90 Carroll Coll., Inc. v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 570 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The college had conceded 
jurisdiction under Catholic Bishop, and instead brought a challenge under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012); see Carroll Coll., 558 F.3d at 570. Nevertheless, 
the NLRB Regional Director concluded that the college was not exempt under the “substantial 
religious character” test, but also noted that it would fail to meet the first prong of the Great Falls 
standard. See Carroll Coll., 558 F.3d at 573. The Regional Director found Carroll’s public state-
ments “of principle and purpose” to be merely “aspirational” rather than demonstrative of an actu-
al religious environment sufficient to exempt the school from NLRB jurisdiction. See id. The 
Regional Director also found no evidence of religious control or involvement in the operation of 
the school. See id. 
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for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.91 The court applied the Great 
Falls test, concluding that Carroll College clearly met its requirements.92 
The court rejected the nature of the Board’s “skeptical inquiry” into the op-
erations of the college, characterizing it as a “heightened standard” depart-
ing from Great Falls.93 
D. Religious Educators: Contradictory Messages, Questions of Autonomy 
Although courts have limited the NLRB’s jurisdiction over schools 
controlled by religious organizations, these religious organizations ironical-
ly often possess traditional doctrines or official contemporary platforms that 
promote workers’ rights.94 Many of the major faiths in the United States 
have voiced strong support for the labor movement and the rights of work-
ers.95 The American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A., the United Methodist 
Church, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, and the Central 
Conference of American Rabbis are among the faith organizations that have 
made official declarations of support for workers’ right to unionize.96 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Carroll Coll., 558 F.3d at 570, 572. 
 92 Id. at 572, 574 (noting that it should have been readily apparent to the Board that the col-
lege was exempt from jurisdiction under Catholic Bishop); see also Stabile, supra note 11, at 1328 
n.67 (characterizing the Carroll College court as “reiterat[ing]” the Great Falls test); Macri, supra 
note 85, at 624 n.94 (characterizing the Carroll College court as “reaffirm[ing]” the Great Falls 
approach). The court pointed to the college’s charter documents, mission statement and statement 
of purpose, and formal written agreement with the Synod as evidence sufficient to satisfy the first 
prong of the Great Falls test. See Carroll Coll., 558 F.3d at 572. 
 93 Carroll Coll., 558 F.3d at 573. In assessing whether the school holds itself out as providing 
a religious environment, the Board should not, the court stated, look any deeper than the institu-
tion’s public statements and publicly available materials. See id. The court reasoned that a more 
probing inquiry “is tantamount to questioning the sincerity of the school’s public representations 
about the significance of its religious affiliation.” See id. 
 94 See Kathryn Jean Lopez, Keeping Faith with Labor: Can Unions and Churches Maintain 
Their Longtime Friendship?, LABOR WATCH (July 2003), available at http://www.catholiceducation.
org/en/religion-and-philosophy/social-justice/keeping-faith-with-labor-can-unions-and-churches-mai
ntain-their-longtime-friendship.html [http://perma.cc/HKZ9-KGZP] (describing the strong historical 
ties between religious groups and the American labor movement); What Faith Groups Say About 
Workers’ Freedom to Choose a Union, NAT’L INTERFAITH COMM. FOR WORKER JUST., http://www.
aflcio.org/content/download/2552/24720/Faith+Groups+on+Employee+Workers’+Freedom+to+Cho
ose+a+Union.pdf [http://perma.cc/PF4G-HKUF] [hereinafter Workers’ Freedom] (listing official 
statements of eleven religious bodies in support of the labor movement and workers’ rights). 
 95 See Lopez, supra note 94 (noting “the longtime partnership between labor unions” and 
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faith leaders); Workers’ Freedom, supra note 94 (listing official 
statements of eleven religious bodies in support of the labor movement and workers’ rights). 
 96 See Workers’ Freedom, supra note 94. The American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. Reso-
lution of 1981 expressed clear support for workers’ “right to organize.” Id. The Social Principles 
of the United Methodist Church similarly stated support for the right to unionize and bargain col-
lectively. Id. The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church declared, in 1995, that “[a]ll 
workers . . . have the right to choose to organize for the purposes of collective bargaining.” Id. The 
Central Conference of American Rabbis, at its 1993 Annual Convention, adopted a Resolution 
stating: “Jewish leaders, along with our Catholic and Protestant counterparts, have always sup-
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Nowhere is this support for workers’ rights more evident than the 
Catholic Church.97 As early as 1891, Pope Leo XIII voiced support for labor 
unions, calling for the establishment of organizations to take the place of the 
previously eradicated labor guilds.98 In 1986, the U.S Conference of Catho-
lic Bishops declared its full support for workers’ right to unionize.99 The 
Bishops even went so far as to state, notably: “All church institutions must 
also fully recognize the rights of employees to organize and bargain collec-
tively with the institution through whatever association or organization they 
freely choose.”100 
Despite the Catholic Church’s formal rhetoric, many of the notable chal-
lenges to NLRB jurisdiction over religious schools have come from organiza-
tions affiliated with or controlled by the Church.101 This can, in part, be ex-
plained by the significant role the Church plays in education in America, with 
nearly three million students attending approximately 7000 Catholic schools 
                                                                                                                           
ported the labor movement and the rights of employees to form unions for the purpose of engaging 
in collective bargaining and attaining fairness in the workplace.” Id. 
 97 See Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective Bargaining 
Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom from and Freedom for, 49 VILL. L. REV. 77, 105 
(2004) (noting the Catholic Church’s longstanding support of workers’ right to unionize and bar-
gain collectively); Lopez, supra note 94 (describing the Catholic Church as “historically the most 
recognizable and organized church advocate of U.S. labor unions”). 
 98  See Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (On the Condition of the Working Classes) 
§ 3 (1891), http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_
rerum-novarum.html [http://perma.cc/WY8K-9CNS] (calling for a replacement for the “working-
men’s guilds” that had been abolished). Pope Leo XIII went on to praise the beneficial opportuni-
ties afforded by “workingmen’s unions.” Id. Nearly a century later, Pope John Paul II echoed 
these sentiments, calling unions “an indispensable element of social life, especially in modern 
industrialized societies,” and “a mouthpiece for the struggle for social justice.” See Pope John Paul 
II, Laborem Exercens (On Human Work) § 20 (1981), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-
ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens.html [http://perma.cc/6E7Y-
8GRL]. 
 99  U.S. CATH. BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE ECONOMY ¶ 104 (1986), http://www.usccb.org/upload/economic_
justice_for_all.pdf [http://perma.cc/XKL5-UMGV] (“The Church fully supports the right of work-
ers to form unions or other associations to secure their rights to fair wages and working conditions 
. . . . No one may deny the right to organize without attacking human dignity itself.”); see also 
Brady, supra note 97, at 116 (noting the pastoral letter’s focus on elevating the role and involve-
ment of the employee in the “operation and management” of business organizations). 
 100 See U.S. CATH. BISHOPS, supra note 99, ¶ 353. The Bishops, noting the availability of 
“new creative models of collaboration between labor and management,” urged “church institutions 
to adopt new fruitful modes of cooperation” with employees. See id. 
 101 See, e.g., Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 492 (schools challenging jurisdiction controlled 
by Catholic Bishop of Chicago and Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend); Bayamon, 793 F.2d at 
399–400 (university challenging jurisdiction administratively controlled by the Dominican order 
of the Catholic Church); Bishop Ford, 623 F.2d at 823–24 (school challenging jurisdiction inde-
pendently operated but largely controlled by Diocese of Brooklyn); St. Joseph’s Coll., 282 
N.L.R.B. at 65 (college challenging jurisdiction largely controlled and supported by the Sisters of 
Mercy of Maine); Notre Dame, 245 N.L.R.B. at 386 (college challenging jurisdiction inde-
pendently operated but affiliated with the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur). 
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across the United States.102 But the question remains: why do religious organ-
izations, such as the Catholic Church, officially and strongly promote work-
ers’ rights while simultaneously resisting NLRB efforts to do the same?103 
The dominant answer put forward by religious organizations them-
selves is the potential loss of autonomy over decisions central to faith, doc-
trine, and religious mission.104 Specifically, these institutions are concerned 
that the subjects of collective bargaining could potentially reach to their 
core religious functions.105 Yet some have suggested that religious institu-
                                                                                                                           
 102 See United States Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools, supra note 1; see also 
FAQs: Catholic Higher Education, ASS’N CATH. C. & U., http://www.accunet.org/i4a/pages/index
.cfm?pageid=3797#HowMany [http://perma.cc/FV8N-AZ6J]. As of the 2011–12 academic year, 
there were 262 Catholic institutions of higher education in the United States enrolling 940,000 
students. See FAQs: Catholic Higher Education, supra. In the 2014–15 academic year, there were 
6568 Catholic elementary and secondary schools in the United States (5368 elementary; 1200 
secondary) enrolling 1,939,574 students. See United States Catholic Elementary and Secondary 
Schools, supra note 1. 
 103 See Brady, supra note 97, at 105 (pointing to the inconsistency between longstanding Church 
position on unionization and collective bargaining and Catholic employers’ refusal to bargain collec-
tively); Stabile, supra note 11, at 1331 (noting that Catholic social doctrine strongly supports collec-
tive bargaining among workers); Brian Fraga, Unions, Yes. But When the Church Is Employer?, OUR 
SUNDAY VISITOR (Apr. 6, 2011), https://www.osv.com/OSVNewsweekly/ByIssue/Article/TabId/
735/ArtMID/13636/ArticleID/10096/Unions-yes-But-when-the-Church-is-employer.aspx [http://perma.
cc/57P3-TQWN] (“Despite Catholic teaching on workers’ rights to organize, U.S. Church leaders 
and institutions have often had a history of strained relationships with their employees . . . .”); Clay-
ton Sinyai, Which Side Are We on?, AMERICA MAG. (Jan. 19, 2015), http://americamagazine.org/
issue/which-side-are-we [http://perma.cc/V8MN-YSU4] (quoting Brian Klisavage, President, Fed-
eration of Pittsburgh Diocesan Teachers, as stating: “How can the church support the rights of steel-
workers and grape pickers when we don’t support the rights of our own?”). 
 104 See Brady, supra note 97, at 105 (summarizing the entanglement and autonomy concerns 
cited by employers in resisting Board jurisdiction). Courts have seconded this answer in the con-
text of parochial schools. See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 502 (concluding that the resolution 
of unfair labor practices by the Board “in many instances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the 
good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school’s 
religious mission”); Bishop Ford, 623 F.2d at 822 (stating that the risk of entanglement issues in 
NLRB investigation of unfair labor practices is “real and not theoretical”); see also Brief for Re-
spondents at 15, Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. 390 (No. 77-752), 1978 WL 207227 (arguing that 
Board jurisdiction over teachers at Catholic colleges and universities would result in the Board 
“directing or influencing religious matters” at the schools with “[t]he Church . . . shar[ing] its 
authority” with unions); Brief for Petitioners at 40, Great Falls II, 278 F.3d 1335 (No. 00-1415), 
2001 WL 36037993 (arguing that those operating the university feel bound to do so in accordance 
with their religious obligations); Adelle M. Banks, Religious College Presidents Agree on Common 
Threats to Their Schools, CRUX (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.cruxnow.com/life/2015/02/04/religious-
college-presidents-agree-on-calling-and-common-threats-to-their-schools [http://perma.cc/EV66-VA
QN] [hereinafter Statement of John Garvey] (statement of John Garvey, President, Catholic Univer-
sity of America, expressing concern that the federal government would exert control “over the 
people and the courses that are being taught at religious universities”); Open Letter from Charles 
J. Dougherty, Ph.D., President, Duquesne Univ. (June 22, 2012), http://www.duq.edu/news/
president-doughertys-letter-addressing-an-nlrb-issue [http://perma.cc/M3E3-VGZK] (warning that 
unionization could result in the loss of the university’s religious identity). 
 105 See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 502–03 (detailing the ways in which Board resolution 
of unfair labor practice complaints against church-operated schools is likely to veer into questions 
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tions use the autonomy concern only to mask the true reason they object to 
NLRB jurisdiction: they simply would rather not engage in mandatory col-
lective bargaining with their employees.106 Others argue that even if moti-
vated by legitimate concerns, Catholic institutions have an obligation to 
bargain with employees.107 
II. UNDAUNTED EXPANSION: PACIFIC LUTHERAN UNIVERSITY CREATES A 
NEW LANDSCAPE OF UNCERTAINTY AND HYPOCRISY 
The Board’s 2014 decision in Pacific Lutheran University dramatically 
expanded its reach over religious schools.108 Section A of this Part describes 
Pacific Lutheran.109 Section B looks at the fallout from the decision.110 Sec-
tion C examines its implications for further expanded Board jurisdiction.111 
                                                                                                                           
of religious doctrine and mission). In Catholic Bishop, the Court pointed to actual unfair labor 
complaints cited in the lower court’s opinion to demonstrate the threat of entanglement: two in-
stances in which teachers had not been offered contracts as a result of teaching in opposition to 
Church doctrine, and one instance in which a teacher’s contract was not renewed following a life-
style choice, marriage to a divorced Catholic, disapproved of by the Church. See id. (citing Catho-
lic Bishop II, 559 F.2d at 1125). The Court noted that resolving claims such as these would neces-
sarily involve questioning whether the actions of school administrators were legitimately motivat-
ed by their religious beliefs and the mission of the school. See id. at 502. The Court also expressed 
concern that the Board would be tasked with determining which subjects would fall under mandated 
bargaining, potentially reaching “nearly everything that goes on in the schools.” See id. at 503 
(quoting Springfield Educ. Ass’n v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19, 547 P.2d 647, 650 (Or. Ct. App. 
1976)). The Court invoked a 1975 opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in warning that 
mandatory collective bargaining would necessarily produce “encroachment upon the former au-
tonomous position of management.” See id. (quoting Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. State Coll. Area 
Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 267 (Pa. 1975)). 
 106 See Brady, supra note 97, at 81 (conceding that not all religious employers resisting govern-
ment interference “will use their freedom well”); David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Reli-
gion Through Labor and Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REV. 27, 67 (1992) 
(anticipating that some religious employers “may be tempted to invoke the secular doctrine of the legal 
regime to avoid the higher internal obligations” of their faith); Beth Griffin, Adjunct Faculty Want to 
Form Union at Catholic University, Two Colleges, CATH. NEWS SERV. (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.
catholicnews.com/services/englishnews/2013/adjunct-faculty-want-to-form-union-at-catholic-univers
ity-two-colleges.cfm [http://perma.cc/K6PR-BDLA] (quoting Duquesne University professor assert-
ing that the university’s resistance is about preventing unionization rather than religious autonomy); 
Sinyai, supra note 103 (arguing that if Duquesne University is truly concerned about religious auton-
omy, the best solution would be “collective bargaining outside the N.L.R.B. framework”). 
 107 See Gregory, supra note 106, at 67 (arguing that religious organizations have an obligation 
to deal with their employees according to the teachings of their religion); Sinyai, supra note 103 
(pointing to the inconsistency of Catholic universities contending that they are too religious for 
NLRB jurisdiction while failing to follow their own social teaching). 
 108 See Pac. Lutheran Univ., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 5 (2014) (articulating new test focused 
on holding out of both institution as a whole and specific faculty). 
 109 See infra notes 112–132 and accompanying text. 
 110 See infra notes 139–149 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 150–161 and accompanying text. 
2015] The NLRB’s Expanding Jurisdiction Over Religious Schools 2075 
A. Pacific Lutheran University: Expanding NLRB Jurisdiction Once Again 
In 2014, in Pacific Lutheran University, the Board issued a decision in 
which it asserted jurisdiction over a private university affiliated with the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.112 The challenge arose from the 
university’s objection to a union petition for representation of a unit of con-
tingent Pacific Lutheran faculty.113 In its decision, the Board—which had 
never explicitly adopted the D.C. Circuit’s test in University of Great Falls 
v. NLRB—announced a new standard, drawing largely from, but going be-
yond, Great Falls.114 To qualify for jurisdictional exemption, “an institution 
of higher learning” must satisfy two criteria.115 First, as in Great Falls, the 
institution must “hold[] itself out as providing a religious educational envi-
ronment.”116 But the Board added a second prong: that the college or uni-
versity “holds out the petitioned-for faculty member’s [sic] as performing a 
specific role in creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational 
environment.”117 This second requirement could be satisfied by evidence 
drawn from the public statements of the university to its own faculty or stu-
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 1, 11. 
 113 See id. at 1. 
 114 See id. at 5 (characterizing the new test as “faithful to the holding of Catholic Bishop, 
sensitive to the concerns raised by the parties and amici, and consistent with our statutory duty”); 
see also Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB (Great Falls II), 278 F.3d 1335, 1343, 1347–48 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (laying out Great Falls test); Catholic Soc. Servs., 355 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 1–2 (2010) (de-
clining to apply Great Falls test to Catholic social-service agency whose primary purpose was not 
education); Salvation Army, 345 N.L.R.B. 550, 550 (2005) (declining to apply Great Falls test 
because institution, though religious, was not involved in education). 
 115 Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 5. The Board’s decision is explicitly limited to 
faculty of colleges and universities. Id. at 10 n.11; see also Berman, supra note 19 (noting that the 
Board’s decision is limited to faculty members of colleges and universities). 
 116 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 5. The Board added that evidence of non-
profit status “may be relevant in an examination of how a university holds itself out.” Id. at 7. The 
Board declined to adopt the third prong of the Great Falls test. Id. 
 117 See id. The Board stated that once the first threshold requirement is met, “the focus of our 
inquiry into whether there is a ‘significant risk’ of infringement . . . must be on the faculty mem-
bers themselves, rather than on the nature of the university as a whole.” Id. at 10 (quoting NLRB 
v. Catholic Bishop of Chi. (Catholic Bishop III), 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979)). The Board’s rationale 
for this added requirement was based on Catholic Bishop’s emphasis on the role of the teacher in 
furthering the religious mission of parochial schools. See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 501 
(describing “the critical and unique role of the teacher in fulfilling the mission of a church-
operated school”); Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 57 at 7–8. Where college or university facul-
ty members occupy no such role in furthering the institution’s religious mission, the Board rea-
soned, the First Amendment concerns raised in Catholic Bishop are not present and NLRB juris-
diction is appropriate. See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 8 (“By contrast, where faculty 
members are not expected to play such a role in effectuating the university’s religious mission and 
are not under religious control or discipline, the same sensitive First Amendment concerns of 
excessive entanglement . . . are not implicated.”). Such faculty members, the Board stated, “are 
indistinguishable from faculty at colleges and universities which do not identify themselves as 
religious institutions and which are indisputably subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.” Id.  
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dents, potential faculty or students, or to the public at large.118 In extending 
the “holding out” principle to the role of faculty, the Board sought to avoid 
invasive inquiries into institutional operations.119 The Board also reasoned 
that the “holding out” requirement would incorporate the “market check” 
principle, for universities will be discouraged from overstating the religious 
requirements placed on faculty so as not to discourage potential applicants 
for employment.120 
Applying this new test, the Board found that Pacific Lutheran failed to 
meet the test’s second prong.121Although the Board found that the university 
as a whole held itself out as providing a religious educational environment, it 
found that the university did not hold out the particular unit of contingent fac-
ulty seeking union representation as playing a role in that religious environ-
ment.122 In support of this conclusion, the Board noted how the university did 
not consider religion in hiring or evaluating contingent faculty members, how 
faculty members testified that religion was not discussed in the hiring pro-
cess, and how the university issued statements encouraging diversity.123 
Two NLRB Members dissented from the Board’s decision in Pacific 
Lutheran, both arguing for application of the Great Falls test and against its 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 8–9 (stating that jurisdiction will be applied 
where the institution “‘holds out’ its faculty members, in communications to current or potential 
students and faculty members, and the community at large, as performing a specific role in creat-
ing or maintaining the university’s religious purpose or mission”). The Board stated that it would 
not scrutinize “faculty members’ actual performance of their duties,” but also would not find suf-
ficient only “[g]eneralized statements that faculty members are expected to, for example, support 
the goals or mission of the university.” See id. at 8. The Board further clarified that university 
statements of “commitment to diversity and academic freedom” would fall in favor of exercising 
jurisdiction, as they reinforce the signal that religion would not affect “faculty members’ job du-
ties or responsibilities.” See id. Examples of appropriate sources of evidence listed by the Board 
include “job descriptions, employment contracts, faculty handbooks, statements to accrediting 
bodies, and statements to prospective and current faculty and students.” Id. at 9. The Board 
pledged not to “look behind these documents,” but rather to take them at face value. See id. 
 119 See id. at 10 (characterizing the “holding out” requirement as avoiding judging the institu-
tion’s beliefs, asking it to explain those beliefs, or pressuring it to modify its practices). 
 120 See id. at 9 (noting that, akin to prospective students picking a college, potential employ-
ees could be either discouraged or attracted by overt university statements about the religious 
responsibilities of faculty). In Great Falls, the D.C. Circuit articulated the same principle regard-
ing the effect on potential applicants of universities’ religious statements. See Great Falls II, 278 
F.3d at 1344. 
 121 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 12. 
 122 See id. at 13 (concluding that the university does not “hold [faculty] out as performing any 
religious function in creating or maintaining its religious educational environment”). 
 123 Id. at 14 (finding “nothing” in university documents that would indicate to existing or 
potential faculty or the university community that contingent faculty fill a religious role). The 
Board did note that employment contracts contained a requirement that faculty members “be 
committed to the mission and objectives of the University.” Id. at 13. The Board dismissed this 
provision, however, as the “type of representation [that] does not communicate the message that 
employees are expected to perform a specific religious function and is not specifically linked to 
any job duties to be performed by the faculty.” Id. at 13 n.25. 
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extension to specific faculty members.124 Member Johnson, in his dissent, 
first reemphasized the constitutional avoidance principles articulated in 
Catholic Bishop.125 He then expressed support for the first prong of the 
Board’s new test—whether the institution holds itself out as providing a 
religious educational environment—adopted from Great Falls.126 Member 
Johnson opposed, however, the second prong, pointing to U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent warning against governmental line-drawing between the 
religious and the secular, and against the resulting burden on the institution 
to conform to those categorizations.127 To Member Johnson, the majority 
misjudged the university’s embrace of academic freedom and diversity, fail-
ing to appreciate the degree to which widely held secular values can overlap 
with important religious principles.128 Member Johnson went on to criticize 
the majority’s test as being overly subjective and demonstrating a lack of 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See id. at 27 (Miscimarra, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (favoring the 
Great Falls standard and stating that the Board lacks jurisdiction over Pacific Lutheran under that 
standard); id. at 28 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (expressing lack of support for new test and 
expressing preference for the Great Falls standard). 
 125 See Catholic Bishop III, 434 U.S. at 507 (declining, given the lack of explicit congression-
al intent to include parochial school teachers in NLRB jurisdiction, to choose an interpretation of 
the NLRA that would require the Court to decide constitutional questions); Pac. Lutheran, 361 
N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 29 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (noting that, despite its importance, the 
NLRA is outweighed by the First Amendment and citing Catholic Bishop’s avoidance “warning”). 
Member Johnson summarized the Board’s limitations after Catholic Bishop: “We are commanded, 
in any situation in which the rights protected by the Act could be interpreted as violating the Con-
stitution, to determine whether there is a possible construction of the Act that would avoid such 
problems.” Id. 
 126 See Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1343 (exempting an institution from Board jurisdiction 
based in part on whether “it . . . ‘holds itself out to students, faculty and community’ as providing 
a religious educational environment” (quoting Universidad Cent. de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 
383, 403 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc)); Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 30 (Johnson, Mem-
ber, dissenting) (arguing that the first prong of the new test is helpful in establishing that the 
school is in fact “a bona fide religious institution” and that jurisdiction would therefore raises First 
Amendment concerns). 
 127 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 30–31 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (oppos-
ing second prong of Pacific Lutheran test and invoking Supreme Court disapproval of probing 
inquiries into religious views of institution); see, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) 
(describing inquiring into a school’s religious beliefs to determine whether it is “pervasively sec-
tarian” as “offensive”); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 694 (1989) (calling “pervasive mon-
itoring” of institutions for religious or sectarian character a “central danger against which [the 
Court has] held the Establishment Clause guards” (quoting Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 
(1985))); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (calling it a “signifi-
cant burden” to force a religious institution to anticipate “on pain of substantial liability . . . which 
of its activities a secular court will consider religious”); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 
125, 133 (1977) (“The prospect of church and state litigating in court about what does or does not 
have religious meaning touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee against religious 
establishment . . . .”). 
 128 Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 32 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (pointing to 
possibility of “religious and secular parallelism”). 
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appreciation for the nuances of religious education, characterizing it as a 
“repackaged” version of the “substantial religious character” test.129 
Member Johnson then argued for the Board to adopt a standard essen-
tially identical to the Great Falls test.130 Under the application of this test to 
the facts of Pacific Lutheran University, Member Johnson concluded that 
the Board should have declined to exercise jurisdiction.131 He also argued, 
though, that even under the majority’s test, the university should be exempt, 
given the unique nature of the Lutheran educational mission and the role of 
faculty therein.132 
B. The Pacific Lutheran Fallout 
In the wake of the Board’s decision in Pacific Lutheran, NLRB offi-
cials have taken a newly expansive view of Board jurisdiction over reli-
gious schools.133 On March 3, 2015, the NLRB Regional Director for Re-
gion 19 issued a decision in the case of Seattle University, a Jesuit Catholic 
institution.134 A unit of non-tenure-track, contingent faculty employed by 
the university was seeking union representation.135 After the Regional Di-
rector ordered a representation election, which thereby recognized Board 
jurisdiction over the university, the university appealed for lack of jurisdic-
                                                                                                                           
 129 Id. (criticizing oversimplified view of the religious versus the secular in the context of 
education). 
 130 Id. at 35. The only difference between the test articulated in Great Falls and that recom-
mended by Member Johnson is the latter’s full endorsement of the third prong (affiliation with a 
religious organization), while the Great Falls court declined to fully adopt it. See Great Falls II, 
278 F.3d at 1343–44 (no need to reach third prong of test in that case); Pac. Lutheran, 361 
N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 35 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (stating that third prong will ensure only 
“bona fide” religious schools escape jurisdiction). 
 131 Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 35 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (arguing that 
Pacific Lutheran satisfies Great Falls test). 
 132 Id. at 36 (arguing that Pacific Lutheran holds out its faculty as occupying a significant role 
in school’s religious mission). 
 133 See Manhattan Coll., No. 02-RC-023543, 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 172, at *4 
(N.L.R.B. Aug. 26, 2015) (finding adjunct faculty at Catholic university fail second prong of Pa-
cific Lutheran test); Duquesne Univ., No. 06-RC-080933, 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 104, 
at *3 (N.L.R.B. June 5, 2015) (same); Saint Xavier Univ., No. 13-RC-022025, 2015 NLRB Reg. 
Dir. Dec. LEXIS 97, at *33 (N.L.R.B. June 1, 2015) (same); Seattle Univ., No. 19-RC-122863, 
2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 39, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 3, 2015) (same). 
 134 See Seattle Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 39, at *1; About Seattle University, 
SEATTLE U., http://www.seattleu.edu/about [http://perma.cc/H93F-MLCK] (“Seattle University . . . 
is a Jesuit Catholic university . . . .”). The term “Jesuit” refers to the Society of Jesus, a Catholic order 
closely associated with education. See One Mission, Many Ministries, SOC’Y JESUS, http://jesuits.org/
whatwedo [http://perma.cc/77HL-DTY6] (describing education as “a cornerstone of the Society of 
Jesus”). 
 135 See Seattle Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 39, at *2. 
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tion.136 The Board then remanded the case for further review in light of the 
Pacific Lutheran decision.137 
Applying the new Pacific Lutheran test, the Regional Director found 
that, although the university met the first requirement, the faculty unit in 
question was not beyond the scope of NLRB jurisdiction.138 In his analysis, 
the Regional Director examined the statements made to the faculty in ques-
tion during the hiring process and in the course of employment.139 Finding a 
lack of religious requirements imposed on contingent faculty, with the ex-
ception of a “generalized” statement requiring religious respect in the facul-
ty handbook, the Regional Director concluded that the faculty members 
were not held out as performing a religious function.140 
Then, in the span of less than three months, NLRB Regional Directors 
found jurisdiction appropriate at three Roman Catholic colleges and univer-
sities.141 On June 1, 2015, the Regional Director for Region 13 issued a de-
cision in the case of Saint Xavier University, also a Roman Catholic univer-
sity, and similarly concluded that the university failed the second prong of 
the Pacific Lutheran test as applied to adjunct faculty.142 And on June 5, 
2015, the Regional Director for Region 6 reached the same conclusion re-
garding adjunct faculty at Duquesne University, another Catholic universi-
ty.143 Manhattan College, also a Roman Catholic university, followed on 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See id. at *1–2. 
 137 See Seattle Univ., No. 19-RC-122863, 2015 WL 456610, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 3, 2015) 
(remanding to Regional Director “for further appropriate action consistent with Pacific Lutheran 
University”). 
 138 See Seattle Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 39, at *9–10 (concluding that the 
university failed to establish “that its faculty serve a specific role in creating or maintaining the 
university’s religious educational environment.”). 
 139 See id. at *4–6. 
 140 See id. at *9–10. The “generalized” faculty handbook statement read: “[E]ach member of 
the faculty is expected to show respect for the religious dimension of human life.” Id. at *9. The 
Regional Director compared this with a similar statement in the Pacific Lutheran University hand-
book, and found the Seattle statement “significantly weaker.” See id. The Regional Director also 
noted that the faculty handbook’s “specific responsibilities” section does not mention religion, but 
requires faculty to “maintain competence as teachers and an understanding of current develop-
ments in their disciplines.” See id. at *9–10. The Regional Director did not note, however, that 
“specific responsibilities” also include “primary responsibility for course and curriculum devel-
opment” and “participat[ion] in University governance through faculty and committee activities.” 
See id. at 30. 
141 Manhattan Coll., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 172, at *4; Duquesne Univ., 2015 
NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 104, at *3; Saint Xavier Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 
97, at *33. 
 142 See Saint Xavier Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 97, at *33. The exception to 
this category of faculty was those teaching at the university’s Pastoral Ministry Institute, which 
offered specialized religious coursework. See id. at *32–33. 
 143 See Duquesne Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 104, at *3. 
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August 26, 2015, after the Region 2 Regional Director found that it, too, 
failed the second prong of the Pacific Lutheran test for adjunct faculty.144 
C. How Far Does the Board Intend to Go? 
The NLRB’s decision in Pacific Lutheran University created new con-
fusion and perpetuated old uncertainty over a number of critical factors for 
religious educational institutions in the United States.145 It is still unclear, 
for example, to which schools Catholic Bishop applies.146 And it is unclear 
whether the Board intends to further expand its jurisdiction beyond institu-
tions resembling Pacific Lutheran University—and, if so, how far the Board 
intends to go.147 
On the latter question, the Regional Directors’ decisions in Seattle 
University, Saint Xavier University, Duquesne University, and Manhattan 
College clarified, somewhat, the expected scope of Board jurisdiction in the 
wake of Pacific Lutheran.148 If adjunct faculty at these universities are sub-
ject to NLRB jurisdiction, it would appear that similar decisions will be 
reached at other religious colleges and universities; unless the institution 
can point to a more specific religious requirement expressed to prospective 
or employed faculty, the outcome will likely be the same.149 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See Manhattan Coll., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 172, at *4. 
 145 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 5 (articulating new test focused on whether a 
college or university holds out faculty members as performing a specific role in the institution’s 
religious environment); Mary Kay Klimesh et al., Education Unions Ignore NLRB’s Call for 
“Timeout,” SEYFARTH SHAW (June 3, 2014), http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/OMM060
314-LE2 [http://perma.cc/R4H5-GF2F] (“For now, religious schools can do little more than sit 
and wait for the ultimate decision from the Board on [jurisdiction over religious schools].”). 
 146 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 5 n.4 (stating that Catholic Bishop dealt only 
to teachers at parochial schools, and that its reasoning was then extended to faculty of colleges and 
universities); Stabile, supra note 11, at 1328–29 (noting that there are two different schools of 
thought as to the “extent to which Catholic Bishop should be read to apply to religious colleges 
and universities”). 
 147 See Klimesh et al., supra note 12 (“Although most of the education cases involve colleges 
and universities, the principles presented in them have the potential for impacting primary and 
secondary schools . . . .”); Statement Following the NLRB Ruling Regarding Pacific Lutheran 
University, ASS’N CATH. C. & U. (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.accunet.org/files/Religious%20
Liberty/NLRB-PLU-statement-final.pdf [http://perma.cc/VLE3-TUDF] (“Because the Board [in 
Pacific Lutheran University] stated that it would apply this new standard to other pending cases, 
its decision is likely to affect a number of [Catholic colleges and universities].”). 
 148 See Manhattan Coll., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 172, at *4 (finding adjunct facul-
ty at Catholic university fail second prong of Pacific Lutheran test); Duquesne Univ., 2015 NLRB 
Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 104, at *3 (same); Saint Xavier Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 
97, at *33 (same); Seattle Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 39, at *2 (same). 
 149 See Manhattan Coll., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 172, at *30–36 (describing lack 
of religious requirements for attaining and maintaining employment as a faculty member); Du-
quesne Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 104, at *26–29 (describing lack of religious 
requirements for attaining and maintaining employment as adjunct faculty); Saint Xavier Univ., 
2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 97, at *28–33 (describing lack of religious requirements for 
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But beyond religious colleges and universities, another question remains 
unanswered, one with potentially vast implications not considered in decades: 
will the Board assert jurisdiction over employees of religious elementary and 
secondary schools?150 Since Catholic Bishop, the Board’s jurisdictional ex-
pansion has been almost exclusively limited to religious colleges and univer-
sities.151 Pacific Lutheran, on its face, explicitly applies only to colleges and 
universities.152 But the decision, and its new role-specific test, opens the door 
to broader jurisdiction claims potentially beyond higher education.153 If it is 
no longer the nature of the school, but the role of the specific employee that 
determines the Board’s jurisdiction, the de facto blanket exemption for ele-
mentary and secondary schools could be lifted.154 
                                                                                                                           
attaining and maintaining employment as adjunct faculty); Seattle Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. 
Dec. LEXIS 39, at *25–27 (describing lack of religious requirements for attaining and maintaining 
employment as a faculty member); Jose A. Olivieri, Is Pacific Lutheran Standard a Hail Mary for 
Adjuncts?, LAW360 (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/685780/is-pacific-lutheran-
standard-a-hail-mary-for-adjuncts [http://perma.cc/7BWU-25BK] (pointing to the fact-intensive 
nature of several of the Regional Directors’ decisions and suggesting that to escape jurisdiction 
colleges and universities will need to show religious requirements beyond what is seen in these 
employment relationships). 
 150 See Berman, supra note 19 (pointing out that Pacific Lutheran left open the question of 
whether the reasoning will be extended to elementary and high schools); Klimesh et al., supra 
note 12 (“Although most of the education cases involve colleges and universities, the principles 
presented in them have the potential for impacting primary and secondary schools . . . .”). 
 151 See Bishop Ford, 623 F.2d at 822 (declining to exercise jurisdiction over Catholic high 
school in spite of the fact that Diocese no longer directly controlled the school); Jewish Day Sch. 
of Greater Wash., 283 N.L.R.B. 757, 761–62 (1987) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over Jew-
ish K–12 school); Brady, supra note 97, at 78–79 (“The only area of significant disagreement is 
whether the NLRA applies to church-affiliated colleges and universities.”). But see Islamic Saudi 
Acad. Employer, No. 05-RC-080474, 2012 WL 3561042, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 17, 2012) (order-
ing representation election for non-teaching unit of employees), vacated, Islamic Saudi Acad. 
Employer (Islamic Saudi Acad. II), No. 05-RC-080474, 2015 WL 849084, at *1 (N.L.R.B. Feb. 
26, 2015), remanded to Islamic Saudi Acad. Employer (Islamic Saudi Acad. III), No. 05-RC-
080474, 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 176, at *26–27 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 1, 2015). 
 152 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 11 (stating the revised standard will be ap-
plied “when a college or university argues that the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction over a peti-
tioned-for unit of faculty members because the university is a religious one” (emphasis added)). 
 153 See id. at 8 (emphasizing that the focus of the new test is how specific faculty members are 
held out in relation to the institution’s religious environment); Klimesh et al., supra note 12 (not-
ing that the reasoning of the Pacific Lutheran decision could be extended to elementary and high 
schools). 
 154 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 7 (“We find that the focus of our inquiry into 
whether there is a ‘significant risk’ of infringement under Catholic Bishop must be on the faculty 
members themselves, rather than on the nature of the university as a whole.” (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 502)); Klimesh et al., supra note 12 
(noting that the reasoning of the Pacific Lutheran decision could be extended to elementary and 
high schools). On September 1, 2015, though, the Regional Director for Region 5 declined to 
exercise jurisdiction over teachers at an Islamic K–12 school, though he did find jurisdiction was 
appropriate for non-teaching employees. See Islamic Saudi Acad. III, 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. 
LEXIS 176, at *26–27. This decision was based, however, on the school’s extensive religious 
requirements imposed on faculty and expressed before and after hiring; unless parochial schools 
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III. BREAKING THE CYCLE: VOLUNTARY NEGOTIATION AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND PROBLEMATIC  
BOARD EXPANSION 
The NLRB’s Pacific Lutheran University decision was only the latest 
step in a decades-long cycle in which the Board has expanded its jurisdiction 
over religious educational institutions, only to have the courts step in and 
draw it back.155 This pattern highlights the fundamental tension underlying 
NLRB jurisdiction over religious schools: the NLRB strives to properly carry 
out its mission, as defined in the NLRA, in an area in which the employers in 
question are afforded particularly strong constitutional protections.156 It is 
highly likely that the Board’s Pacific Lutheran University standard will be 
challenged in the courts, where it may well be struck down or narrowed.157 
Regardless of the outcome of such a challenge, the test—and the resulting 
Board jurisdiction—is likely unconstitutional when applied to religious 
schools.158 Section A of this Part points out Pacific Lutheran’s dubious consti-
tutional footing, for both colleges and universities and, especially, elementary 
                                                                                                                           
have similar requirements, Islamic Saudi Academy should likely not be read to foreclose the pos-
sibility of expanded Board jurisdiction. See id. at *17–22 (discussing the numerous ways in which 
religion doctrine is woven into the job performance and hiring of teachers and pointing to example 
where teacher was disciplined for nonconformity).  
 155 See Pac. Lutheran Univ., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 327–28 (2014) (Johnson, Member, dis-
senting) (“In the years since [Catholic Bishop], the Board has occasionally attempted to push back 
against the Court’s decision, narrowly construing it in order to once more advance Board jurisdic-
tion over religious schools. The courts of appeals, however, have refused to go along . . . .”); e.g., 
Carroll Coll., Inc. v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying Great Falls test to 
private college affiliated with Presbyterian Church and concluding jurisdiction was not appropri-
ate); Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB (Great Falls II), 278 F.3d 1335, 1347–48 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(replacing the “substantial religious character” standard with new, less intrusive test); Universidad 
Cent. de Bayamon v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 383, 403 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc) (applying Catholic Bish-
op to Catholic college and reversing order of Board jurisdiction). See generally Nat’l Labor Rela-
tions Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi. (Catholic Bishop III), 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding that the 
NLRB does not have jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools). 
 156 See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 499 (stating that, despite the “broad scope” of the 
NLRA, the Constitution generally, and First Amendment specifically, are limits on the Board’s 
power); Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 3 (“[W]e [the Board] are charged with protecting 
workers’ exercise of their rights under the Act to the fullest permissible extent . . . .”); id. at 29 
(Johnson, Member, dissenting) (“[W]hile the [NLRA] is of paramount importance in almost every 
other scenario—it is dwarfed by the First Amendment’s protection of religion.”). 
 157 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 38 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (predicting 
that “the courts will have to, once again, reintroduce the Board to the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance” after the Pacific Lutheran decision); see also id. at 26–27 (Miscimarra, Member, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the difficulty of departures from the Great Falls test 
surviving review by the D.C. Circuit); Berman, supra note 19 (predicting that the Pacific Lutheran 
decision will be reviewed by federal courts of appeal, and perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court); 
Olivieri, supra note 149 (predicting that Pacific Lutheran will be “rejected by the courts”). 
 158 See infra notes 161–191 and accompanying text. 
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and high schools.159 Section B then proposes an alternative way forward that 
could benefit both employees and religious educational institutions: voluntary 
bargaining outside of the NLRB framework.160 
A. The Dubious Footing of Pacific Lutheran 
The Board’s Pacific Lutheran test is highly likely to be challenged in 
the courts.161  There, the standard may well suffer the same fate as the 
Board’s previous “substantial religious character” test and be narrowed or 
rejected outright.162 Unfair labor practice decisions by the Board can be ap-
pealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
which is the same court that, in 2002 in University of Great Falls v. NLRB, 
rejected the “substantial religious character” test in favor of a new, less in-
trusive test.163 It also the court that, just six years ago, affirmed the latter 
standard in Carroll College, Inc. v. NLRB.164 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit is 
unlikely to be receptive to yet another departure from the test it put forward 
in Great Falls.165 Or, as a dissenting NLRB Member wrote in Pacific Lu-
                                                                                                                           
 159 See infra notes 161–191 and accompanying text. 
 160 See infra notes 192–212 and accompanying text. 
 161 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 38 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (predicting 
that “the courts will have to, once again, reintroduce the Board to the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance” after the Pacific Lutheran decision); Statement Following the NLRB Ruling Regarding 
Pacific Lutheran University, supra note 147 (“The courts may ultimately determine the standard 
for NLRB’s jurisdiction over religiously affiliated institutions.”). 
 162 See Carroll Coll., 558 F.3d at 573 (rejecting Board’s application of “heightened standard” 
of inquiry more searching than Great Falls test); Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1341–43 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (rejecting “substantial religious character” test and proposing new, less intrusive three-part 
inquiry); Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 26–27 (Miscimarra, Member, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting the difficulty of departures from the Great Falls test surviving 
review by the D.C. Circuit). 
 163 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012) (giving one aggrieved by a Board decision concerning an unfair 
labor practice the ability to seek “review of such order in any United States court of appeals in the 
circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or where-
in such person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia” (emphasis added)); see Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1341–43 (rejecting “substan-
tial religious character” test and proposing new, less intrusive three-part inquiry). 
 164 See Carroll Coll., 558 F.3d at 573 (rejecting Board’s application of “heightened standard” 
of inquiry more searching than Great Falls test). 
 165 See id. (noting how the Board’s new test went further than what the D.C. Circuit deemed 
permissible in Great Falls); Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1341–43 (rejecting “substantial religious 
character” test and proposing new, less intrusive three-part inquiry); Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. 
No. 157 at 26 (Miscimarra, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he D.C. Cir-
cuit [has already] addressed the very question presented here . . . .”). It is also worth noting that if 
a challenge were to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, it would be reviewed in part by the author of 
the decision that inspired the Great Falls test: then-Judge, now Justice, Stephen Breyer. See Great 
Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1343 (noting that the new three-part test is “drawn partially from Judge Brey-
er’s controlling opinion in Bayamon”); Bayamon, 793 F.2d at 403. 
2084 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:2057 
theran, “even if one disagreed with Great Falls, any attempt by the Board 
to chart a different path appears predestined to futility.”166 
Regardless of the circuit hearing the challenge, the Pacific Lutheran 
test is unlikely to survive judicial review.167 First, whichever federal court 
will hear it is likely to be bound by the same principles of constitutional 
avoidance and deference to Supreme Court precedent, rather than adminis-
trative interpretation, invoked by the court in Great Falls.168 But second, 
and more importantly, Pacific Lutheran would likely be struck down as un-
constitutional.169 
Applying the entanglement test from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1971 
decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman to the facts of Pacific Lutheran, the Board’s 
new test does not fare well.170 The NLRA passes the first part of the Lemon 
test because the law is clearly secular in purpose and even in its primary 
effects.171 But, the application of the Pacific Lutheran test fails the final part 
of the test because in looking beyond the religious nature of the school it-
self, it creates an unconstitutional entanglement with religion.172 The Pacific 
Lutheran test allows for NLRB actions and investigations against religious 
institutions, even if certain faculty members are deemed tangential to their 
religious mission.173 To find entanglement, the Lemon test inquires as to 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 27 (Miscimarra, Member, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 167 See id. at 26 (“[The Pacific Lutheran test] entail[s] an inquiry likely to produce an unac-
ceptable risk of conflict with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.”). 
 168 See Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1340–41 (citing the court’s obligation to follow the Catho-
lic Bishop Court’s avoidance of interpretation that would threaten constitutionality of the statute 
and its deferral to the Court, rather than the NLRB, on matters of constitutional concern). 
 169 See infra notes 172–191 and accompanying text. 
 170 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606–07 (1971) (describing program of state aid 
reimbursement to religious schools). Despite the lack of clarity in prevailing Supreme Court estab-
lishment clause jurisprudence, Lemon remains one of—if not the—most influential standards for 
assessing potential Establishment Clause violations. See Gey, supra note 51, at 764 (chronicling 
the lack of prevailing Establishment Clause standard but including Lemon as one of the remaining 
tests in use); Rassbach, supra note 51, at 492–93 (acknowledging “lack of clarity” on establish-
ment clause jurisprudence but characterizing Lemon as one of two competing standards).  
 171 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (stating the NLRA’s purpose as ensuring the “free flow of 
commerce”); Investigative Charges, supra note 38 (stating that the Board receives between 20,000 
and 30,000 unfair labor practice complaints annually, a very small proportion of which likely 
involve religious employers). 
172 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 5. 
 173 See, e.g., Manhattan Coll., No. 02-RC-023543, 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 172, at 
*4 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 26, 2015) (finding school holds itself out, but not faculty, as providing reli-
gious environment); Duquesne Univ., No. 06-RC-080933, 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 
104, at *3 (N.L.R.B. June 5, 2015) (finding school holds itself out, but not faculty, as providing 
religious environment); Saint Xavier Univ., No. 13-RC-022025, 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEX-
IS 97, at *33 (N.L.R.B. June 1, 2015) (finding school holds itself out, but not faculty, as providing 
religious environment); Seattle Univ., No. 19-RC-122863, 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 39, 
at *2 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 3, 2015) (finding school holds itself out, but not faculty, as providing reli-
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“the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature 
of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the 
government and the religious authority.”174 The first and third factors here 
cut in favor of unconstitutionality: these are overtly religious institutions, 
and the relationship is one where, conceivably, government investigators 
could be routinely, aggressively questioning religious educators about the 
contours and sincerity of their faith.175 
Looking beyond Lemon to more recent cases, Pacific Lutheran fares 
no better.176 In 2000, in Mitchell v. Helms, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 
context of a parochial school, warned courts against the “offensive” act of 
probing the beliefs of religious organizations.177 Moreover, the sampling of 
other situations courts have deemed unacceptable all are reminiscent of 
NLRB Board oversight at religious educational institutions.178 
                                                                                                                           
gious environment); see also Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 12 (finding school holds 
itself out, but not faculty, as providing religious environment). 
 174 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (describing the factors in assessing excessive entanglement). 
 175 See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 502 (stating that the resolution of unfair labor practice 
complaints at parochial schools by the NLRB “in many instances, will necessarily involve inquiry 
into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the 
school’s religious mission”); e.g., Manhattan Coll., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 172, at 
*15 (describing testimony of Brother Jack Curran, the college’s vice president of mission); Seattle 
Univ., 2015 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 39, at *2 (describing the testimony of the university 
president, a Catholic priest); Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 12 (describing relationship 
between university and church); see also John H. Mansfield, Constitutional Limits on the Liability 
of Churches for Negligent Supervision and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1167, 
1178–79 (2003) (describing the Catholic Bishop Court’s concern that government actors would 
judge religious institutions’ beliefs based on subjective, preconceived notions or favor secular 
practices over religious). 
 176 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 
694 (1989); New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977); Presbyterian Church in U.S. 
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969). 
 177 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828 (warning that “courts should refrain from trolling through a[n] 
. . . institution’s religious beliefs”). 
 178 See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 694 (calling “‘pervasive monitoring’” of institutions for reli-
gious or sectarian character a “central danger against which [the Court has] held the Establishment 
Clause guards” (quoting Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985))); Catholic Bishop III, 440 
U.S. at 502 (stating that the resolution of unfair labor practice complaints at parochial schools by 
the NLRB “in many instances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith of the position 
asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to the school’s religious mission”); Ca-
thedral Acad., 434 U.S. at 133 (“The prospect of church and state litigating in court about what 
does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee 
against religious establishment . . . .”); Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450 (noting that the First 
Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving “core” religious questions, such as doctrinal 
issues and their “importance” to the faith); Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 33 (“Many of 
the questions typically arising in cases under the [NLRA] will thrust the Board into the prohibited 
role of arbiting [sic] issues of religious doctrine.”); Investigative Charges, supra note 38 (describ-
ing information-gathering investigation after a charge has been filed, which can include NLRB 
officials taking affidavits). 
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Given the “unique and central role” of the teacher in the parochial 
school system, parochial schools would satisfy both the first and second 
prong of the Pacific Lutheran test.179 If the Board exercised jurisdiction 
over parochial schools, however, the constitutional infirmities seen with col-
lege and university oversight would grow graver still, and the Board’s deci-
sion to exercise jurisdiction would be reversed by the courts.180 First, NLRB 
jurisdiction over parochial schools was the exact scenario reviewed by the 
Court in Catholic Bishop, so the precedent is directly on point.181 Second, 
all of the entanglement concerns present with religious colleges and univer-
sities grow stronger with parochial schools, whose primary purpose can 
fairly be seen as religious inculcation.182 This impacts the Lemon analysis, 
as it deepens the religious nature of the “character and purposes of the insti-
tutions” with which the government will be interacting.183 
Beyond the entanglement issue, the Pacific Lutheran test may also in-
fringe upon religious schools’ First Amendment rights to freely exercise 
their religion.184 By compelling religious schools to alter the way in which 
they fulfill their religious mission, the government is interfering with the 
                                                                                                                           
179 See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 501 (describing “the critical and unique role of the 
teacher in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school”); Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 
157 at 5 (describing the significant role of faculty in satisfying the test to avoid NLRB jurisdic-
tion).  
180 See supra notes 181–190 and accompanying text (arguing that Pacific Lutheran is even 
more clearly unconstitutional when applied to parochial schools and that, regardless, parochial 
schools could satisfy its test). 
 181 See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 492–93 (describing the schools at issue); Lewis Univ., 
265 N.L.R.B. 1239, 1239 (1982) (stating that “Catholic Bishop applies only to parochial elemen-
tary and secondary schools”). Although the Court used the term “church-operated schools” in its 
holding, in 1980 in NLRB v. Bishop Ford Cent. Catholic High School, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that Catholic Bishop’s reasoning applied to religiously affiliated paro-
chial schools regardless of direct diocesan control. See 623 F.2d 818, 822 (2d. Cir. 1980). 
 182 See Catholic Bishop III, 440 U.S. at 501 (observing, of the parochial schools at issue, that 
“[r]eligious authority necessarily pervades the school system” (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617)); 
Private Schools in the United States: A Statistical Profile, 1993–94, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/ps/97459ch2.asp [http://perma.cc/C4UR-T28J] (“The most important goal of 
[Catholic parochial] schools, as rated by their principals, was religious development.”); see also 
SOC’Y OF JESUS, THE CHARACTERISTICS OF JESUIT EDUCATION 19, http://www.sjweb.info/docu
ments/education/characteristics_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/JD55-UERD] (“Jesuit education . . . remains 
an instrument to help students know God better . . . . The aim of Jesuit education is the formation of 
principled, value-oriented persons for others after the example of Jesus Christ. Teaching in a Jesuit 
school, therefore, is a ministry.” (emphasis added)). 
 183 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615 (describing the factors in assessing excessive entanglement). 
184 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (calling it a “signifi-
cant burden” to force a religious institution to anticipate “on pain of substantial liability . . . which 
of its activities a secular court will consider religious”); Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1346 (warning 
against exempting only those religious schools “with hard-nosed proselytizing . . . [and] no aca-
demic freedom”). 
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schools’ free exercise of their religious beliefs.185 The Pacific Lutheran test 
raises the very likely prospect of religious institutions proactively altering 
their practices in response to the threat of litigation and NLRB jurisdic-
tion.186 A prime possible victim of this urge is the freedom typically afford-
ed faculty at religiously affiliated colleges and universities—a critical com-
ponent, for many faiths, of engaging with the wider world in service of 
God.187 It is not hard to imagine an institution now making more overt 
statements in the hiring process and placing more heavy-handed restrictions 
and requirements on faculty.188 This danger also highlights the Board’s sim-
plistic assessment of and shallow appreciation for the history of religious 
education.189 The Pacific Lutheran test, as applied to Pacific Lutheran Uni-
versity and other religious colleges and universities, blatantly fails to 
acknowledge the unique connection between religious mission and educa-
tion.190 To dismiss academic freedom as a sign of secularism betrays the 
perils of passing judgment on the complicated, often nuanced way a reli-
gious institution chooses to carry out its mission.191 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 336; Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1346 (cau-
tioning that limiting the Catholic Bishop exception to only the most rigidly religious institutions 
may suppress schools’ ability to freely express their religion). 
 186 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 31 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (“Requir-
ing a university’s public expressions to demonstrate performance of a ‘specific religious function’ 
by the faculty will likely consequently warp the expression of the university’s religious mission 
itself.”). 
 187 See Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1347 (declining to affirm Board jurisdiction over university 
despite fact that university “espouse[s] belief in academic freedom.”); Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. 
No. 157 at 37 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (arguing that academic freedom is an important doctri-
nal “religious commitment” of Lutheran education); St. Joseph’s Coll., 282 N.L.R.B. 65, 66, 68 
(1986) (declining to affirm Board jurisdiction over college despite its subscription to formal 
statement of academic freedom adopted by the American Association of University Professors); 
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 104, at 31 (“Academic freedom exists within and as a part of the 
University’s Catholic mission.”). 
 188 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 14 (finding “nothing” in university docu-
ments that would indicate to existing or potential faculty or the university community that contin-
gent faculty fill a religious role); id. at 31 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (“The Board should . . . 
avoid creating a test that will act as a harmful mutagen to a religious university’s expressions of its 
own religion.”). 
 189 See Great Falls II, 278 F.3d at 1346 (warning against exempting only those religious 
schools “with hard-nosed proselytizing . . . [and] no academic freedom” and suggesting that doing 
so may itself “violat[e] . . . the most basic command of the Establishment Clause”). 
 190 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 36 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (contend-
ing that “that academic freedom has been a fundamental principle of the Lutheran faith since its 
inception”); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 104, at 11 (statement of Dr. Frederick Gilliard, for-
mer President, Univ. of Great Falls) (“Catholic universities have an extra dimension to them . . . . 
We are at once engaged in intellectual inquiry, but we are also involved in moral development 
. . . . I see academic freedom, Roman Catholicism and higher education all melded into one.”). 
 191 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 31 (Johnson, Member, dissenting) (“The 
majority . . . errs fundamentally . . . by assuming a false dichotomy between ‘religious’ and ‘secu-
lar’ instruction.”); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 104, at 11 (arguing that “[t]he Regional Direc-
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B. Cut Out the Middleman: Voluntary Negotiation  
Outside the NLRB Framework 
Despite the constitutional questions surrounding Board jurisdiction 
over religious educational institutions, employees of these institutions still 
deserve the same rights to collective bargaining and the same protections 
against unfair labor practices that the NLRB provides to other American 
workers.192 Most faiths, including the Catholic Church, support the goals of 
fair treatment of workers and access to union representation.193 In order to 
resolve this conflict, religious educational institutions should create volun-
tary bargaining agreements outside of the NLRB framework.194 
Although many religiously affiliated institutions have resisted NLRB 
jurisdiction, some have voluntarily allowed representation elections to go 
forward unopposed.195 Georgetown University, for example, remained neu-
tral in the lead-up to a representation election for its adjunct faculty.196 This 
                                                                                                                           
tor confused ecumenism and a tolerance for academic freedom with a lack of religious mission” 
and stating that “[a]s the Sisters [of Mercy] . . . see it, the Sisters’ religious mission and the Sis-
ters’ charge to the University are enhanced by academic freedom”). It is not difficult to imagine 
even parochial elementary or secondary schools reacting to potential Board jurisdiction by impos-
ing more rigid religious requirements on both potential and current faculty. See Olivieri, supra 
note 149 (pointing to the fact-intensive nature of several of the Regional Directors’ decisions and 
suggesting that to escape jurisdiction colleges and universities will need to show religious re-
quirements beyond what is seen in these employment relationships). The recent Islamic Saudi 
Academy decision seems to confirm that the more evidence of restrictions on faculty members, the 
better. See Islamic Saudi Acad. (Islamic Saudi Acad. III), No. 05-RC-080474, 2015 NLRB Reg. 
Dir. Dec. LEXIS 176, at *26–27 (N.L.R.B. 2015). 
 192 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157–58 (2012) (detailing purpose of the NLRB and listing prohibited 
unfair labor practices); see Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 3 (“[The Board is] charged 
with protecting workers’ exercise of their rights under the Act to the fullest permissible extent 
. . . .”). 
 193 See Brady, supra note 97, at 105 (“The Catholic Church has long supported the right of 
workers to unionize and bargain collectively with their employers.”); Lopez, supra note 94 
(“[T]he Catholic Church is historically the most recognizable and organized church advocate of 
U.S. labor unions . . . .”); Workers’ Freedom, supra note 94 (listing official statements of eleven 
religious bodies in support of the labor movement and workers’ rights). 
 194 See Sinyai, supra note 103 (arguing in favor of and offering examples of voluntary labor 
agreements between Catholic educational employers and lay teachers); infra notes 195–212 and 
accompanying text. 
 195 See Joseph J. Fahey, Adjunct Unions at Catholic Affiliated Colleges and Universities: A 
Background Paper 3 (Catholic Scholars for Worker Justice, Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.catholics
cholarsforworkerjustice.org/2013%2011-1%20Adjunct%20Background%20Paper%20-%20FAHEY
.pdf [http://perma.cc/H2QG-PS79] (listing Georgetown University, Le Moyne College, and St. 
Francis College as three institutions whose leaders did not oppose adjunct faculty unionization); 
Sinyai, supra note 103 (“Not every Catholic university has responded [negatively] to the organiz-
ing wave among our nation’s adjunct faculty.”). 
 196 See Griffin, supra note 106; Sinyai, supra note 103. The university’s provost, in a state-
ment issued following the vote, cited Georgetown’s “Just Employment Policy” and stated that “the 
university respects employees’ rights to freely associate and organize.” See Griffin, supra note 
106 (quoting statement of Robert M. Groves, Provost, Georgetown University). 
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course may be admirable, but it does nothing to remedy the perceived threat 
of loss of autonomy feared by religious educators and administrators.197 
Alternatively, some schools have proactively and independently pur-
sued bargaining agreements with faculty without NLRB involvement.198 
These agreements typically contain express provisions—known as the 
“Bishop’s clause”—granting the employer the ability to terminate the em-
ployee for matters directly related to religious concerns.199 These clauses 
preserve the autonomy of school leaders over matters central to the reli-
gious mission of the institution while still giving employees access to a 
formal bargaining scheme.200 Rather than involve the Board in bargaining 
matters, both sides can agree to a neutral arbiter.201 Furthermore, members 
of the Board have looked favorably upon alternative dispute resolutions.202 
The voluntary negotiation approach does have its own disadvantages.203 
First, given the recent boldness of the Board in expanding jurisdiction and the 
recent success of faculty units in gaining union representation, many college 
and university faculty would likely prefer to follow that path.204 Second, and 
more significant, voluntary bargaining necessarily concentrates power on the 
side of the institution: if the employer withdraws from bargaining, the em-
ployees have no legal recourse.205 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Brady, supra note 97, at 105 (“[T]he reasons that Catholic employers have given in 
litigation . . . have tended to draw upon the entanglement and concerns raised in [Catholic Bish-
op]. Church employers, litigants argue, will lose autonomy over religious matters and government 
will become entangled in religious doctrine and practices.”); see also Statement of John Garvey, 
supra note 104 (“[The government is] telling religious schools who their faculty can be and what 
the terms and conditions of employment, that is to say, what they can teach . . . . That the govern-
ment ought to have some say over the people and the courses that are being taught at religious 
universities—that’s a big deal for religious freedom.”). 
 198 See Sinyai, supra note 103 (detailing the example of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, where the 
Bishop worked with a variety of interested parties to establish a bargaining system outside the 
NLRB). 
 199 See id. (“In the Pittsburgh contract, the clause states that ‘the Diocesan Bishop shall main-
tain the sole prerogative to dismiss a teacher for public immorality, public scandal or public rejec-
tion of teachings, doctrine or laws of the Catholic Church.’”). 
 200 See id. 
 201 See id. 
 202 See IBM Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1310 (2004) (Liebman & Walsh, Members, dissent-
ing) (noting the potential of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to bring elements of “fair-
ness and due process” to non-union workplaces). 
 203 See Stabile, supra note 11, at 1325 (noting the disadvantages of voluntary bargaining with 
religious employers); Griffin, supra note 106 (noting perception of inevitability among those 
pushing for representation for adjuncts at religious colleges and universities). 
 204 See Griffin, supra note 106 (noting the “consensus” among union organizers seeking rep-
resentation for adjunct faculty at religious colleges and universities that the institutions will inevi-
tably negotiate, whether motivated by religious doctrine or mandated by the NLRB). 
 205 See Stabile, supra note 11, at 1325 (“[Without NLRB jurisdiction], [teachers] may not 
avail themselves of the protection afforded by federal labor law. They can only request a school’s 
administration to recognize their union and engage in collective bargaining with the union, with 
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Despite those drawbacks, voluntary bargaining offers faculty the abil-
ity to work constructively with school leaders on a variety of important, but 
non-religious, aspects of their working terms and conditions.206 It also al-
lows both employer and employee to formally acknowledge the unique sta-
tus of religious educational institutions and those who teach at them.207 This 
proposed alternative is admittedly a better fit for parochial schools than for 
colleges and universities, for a variety of reasons.208 Board jurisdiction over 
religious elementary and secondary schools is far less likely to survive judi-
cial scrutiny than at religious institutions of higher education, so for paro-
chial school teachers this may be the only option.209 
Voluntary bargaining offers religious institutions at all levels the op-
portunity to bring their employment practices in line with their rhetoric.210 
Given the clear, formal support across faith bodies for workers’ rights, those 
institutions—particularly colleges and universities—that resist bargaining 
with employees expose their institutions to charges of hypocrisy.211 This is a 
                                                                                                                           
no recourse if the employer refuses.”). This scenario played out among parochial school teachers 
in Boston in 2004 and New York in 2009. See id. 
 206 See Pac. Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 157 at 27 (Miscimarra, Member, concurring in part 
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 207 See Sinyai, supra note 103 (quoting Catholic teachers’ union president whose members 
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teachers at Catholic schools upon seeking employment there). 
 208 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (acknowledging that “[m]any church-
related colleges and universities are characterized by a high degree of academic freedom”); Grif-
fin, supra note 106 (noting perception of inevitability among those pushing for representation for 
adjuncts at religious colleges and universities); supra notes 181–190 and accompanying text (ar-
guing that Pacific Lutheran is even more clearly unconstitutional when applied to parochial 
schools and that, regardless, parochial schools could satisfy its test). 
 209 See Griffin, supra note 106 (noting perception of inevitability among those pushing for 
representation for adjuncts at religious colleges and universities); supra notes 181–190 and ac-
companying text (arguing that Pacific Lutheran is even more clearly unconstitutional when ap-
plied to parochial schools and that, regardless, parochial schools could satisfy its test). 
 210 See Brady, supra note 97, at 105 (pointing to the inconsistency between longstanding 
Church position on unionization and collective bargaining and Catholic employers’ refusal to 
bargain collectively); Sinyai, supra note 103 (noting that a Catholic institution of higher education 
following Church doctrine on workers’ rights “helps to evangelize the world,” while one that 
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 211 See Griffin, supra note 106 (citing speculation that university resistance to unionization is 
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President, Federation of Pittsburgh Diocesan Teachers, as stating: “How can the church support 
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chance for these institutions to fulfill their religious missions while also 
practicing what they preach.212 
CONCLUSION 
The National Labor Relations Board has an important mandate: pro-
tecting the rights of workers’ through access to collective bargaining and the 
enforcement of unfair labor complaints. This charge meets an oft-competing 
mission, however, when exercised over religiously affiliated educators, who 
are guaranteed the protections of the religion clauses of the First Amend-
ment. With its 2014 decision in Pacific Lutheran University, the NLRB ap-
pears poised to continue to expand its jurisdiction—certainly over religious 
colleges and universities, and perhaps over other levels of educational insti-
tutions such as parochial schools. To do so would be regrettable. First, the 
Pacific Lutheran test is likely unconstitutional because it creates an unneed-
ed government entanglement with religion. Second, Board jurisdiction 
would be inappropriate as exercised over religious elementary and second-
ary schools. In order to avoid NLRB jurisdiction while still giving employ-
ees a productive system for bargaining, religious schools should adopt vol-
untary bargaining agreements. Voluntary bargaining gives religious schools 
an opportunity to practice what they preach while maintaining autonomy 
over what is really at issue in all of these cases: the religious mission and 
identity of the school in question. 
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Workers’ Freedom, supra note 94 (listing official statements of eleven religious bodies in support 
of the labor movement and workers’ rights). 
 212 See Sinyai, supra note 103 (stating that, if a university is truly concerned with loss of reli-
gious autonomy, the clear solution is “collective bargaining outside the N.L.R.B. framework”). 
  
 
 
